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Abstract 
Starting with the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, then moving to Egypt, 
Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen, different revolutions for similar goals have 
recently occurred. While some of these countries, such as Tunisia and Egypt, have 
undergone relatively peaceful transitions, Syria and Libya have been devastated by 
violent confrontations. Many domestic and geopolitical factors played an important 
role in these revolutions but to date, it remains unclear how and when different 
factors are important. This thesis compares the 2011 Egyptian revolution with the 
1989 revolution in Poland in order to have a better understanding of the possible 
future of the Arab Spring. The findings of this thesis highlight the critical role of 
youth groups and civil society organizations in the breakdown of regimes. These 
findings shed light on the answers to the research questions: How did civil society 
and non-governmental groups in Egypt and Poland contribute to regime breakdown? 
What specific roles did they have with regard to the regime breakdown? Such 
questions are important to answer, in order to explain how the power for change is 
actually rooted in the people and society. 
 
           Keywords: Democratic transition, civil society organizations, Arab Spring, 
Solidarity movement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
vi 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Background .............................................................................................................. 1 
1.2 Research question .................................................................................................... 2 
1.2.1         Importance of the research ....................................................................................... 2 
1.3 Methodology ............................................................................................................ 4 
1.4 Thesis Map ............................................................................................................... 5 
 
Literature Review .................................................................................................................... 8 
2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 8 
2.2 Role of social movements and civil society ........................................................... 17 
2.2.1         Social movements .................................................................................................. 17 
2.2.1.1     Four stages of social movements ........................................................................... 18 
2.2.1.2     General social movement literature ....................................................................... 20 
2.3 Domestic and geopolitical variables ...................................................................... 22 
2.3.1         Domestic variables ................................................................................................. 22 
2.3.1.1     The Military’s Role in Democratic Transition ....................................................... 22 
2.3.1.2     Civil society role in democratic transition ............................................................. 24 
2.3.1.3     Social media’s role in democratic transition .......................................................... 26 
2.3.1.4     Economic disparity ................................................................................................ 28 
2.3.2        Geopolitics ............................................................................................................. 30  
2.4           The Democratization Process ................................................................................ 31 
 
The Case of Poland ................................................................................................................ 35 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 35 
3.2 Poland’s road toward democracy ........................................................................... 39 
3.2.1         The strike of the 1980s .......................................................................................... 39 
3.2.2         The 1981 imposition of martial law ....................................................................... 42 
3.2.2.1     Polish Solidarity ..................................................................................................... 42 
3.3 The roundtable talks and the end of the communist regime .................................. 46 
3.4 Geopolitical situation ............................................................................................. 48 
3.4.1         The Church’s role and Pope John Paul the Second ............................................... 49 
  
vii 
 
 
The Case of Egypt.................................................................................................................. 51 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 51 
4.2           Immediate Causes Leading to Regime Breakdown: .............................................. 54 
4.2.1        The Mahalla uprisings in 2008 .............................................................................. 54 
4.2.2        April 6th movement ............................................................................................... 55 
4.2.3        The day of rage ...................................................................................................... 55 
4.2.4        Role of the Army ................................................................................................... 56 
4.3 General Factors behind the revolution ................................................................... 57 
4.3.1         Domestic factors .................................................................................................... 58 
4.4 Geopolitical factors ................................................................................................ 69 
4.5          The role of civil society organizations and youth groups in Egypt’s regime 
breakdown .............................................................................................................................. 74 
 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
viii 
 
` 
 
 
 
 
                             List of Figures 
 
Figure 1           Counting the ballots at an open-air election center ........................................63 
Figure 2           Voting percentages Islamic vs. Secular ..........................................................64 
Figure 3           Egyptian opinions concerning whether Egypt is heading in the right or wrong 
direction .....................................................................................................................71 
Figure 4           How Egyptians perceived the economic situation (April 2011) .....................72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ix 
 
 
 
 
 
                                List of Tables 
 
Table 1           Election Results in People’s Assembly............................................................62 
Table 2           Important social issues in the eyes of youth ....................................................71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 
 
 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
The French revolution, the Russian revolution and through to the 1952 Egyptian revolution 
and the Islamic revolution in Iran were all influential events that were the result of internal 
and geopolitical factors and left behind them huge effects on both domestic and 
international levels. The causes of revolutions are complex and idiosyncratic, but there are 
also some commonalities that can be found across them—even when they have occurred at 
different times and in different regions. It is in search of commonalities that this thesis 
seeks to better understand the causes leading to the Arab Spring revolutions and their 
consequences on the political, economic and social levels. Specifically, this thesis examines 
the cases of Egypt and Poland. To better understand the Egyptian uprising, it will be 
compared with Poland’s uprising in the late 1980s, which led to the collapse of the 
communist system and the country’s break away from Soviet tutelage. A comparative 
approach will be adopted in order to explain domestic and geopolitical factors that I will 
identify in the Egyptian and Polish revolutions; therefore I will be focusing on each case 
independently then subsequently comparing them. Most importantly, the thesis will seek to 
answer the following central research question: How did civil society and non-
governmental groups contribute to regime breakdown? To that end, the thesis will also be 
studying facts to better understand the effects of each of the two conditions. Secondary 
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sources of references from books, articles, and presentations will be used towards 
supporting the findings of this paper. The qualitative research technique is the major 
instrument throughout the paper, in order to be able to answer the research question. 
1.2 Research question 
The discussions regarding the revolutions that took place in Egypt and Poland in the 
literature bring various perspectives on the reasons, catalysts and effective outcomes of 
these revolutions. Some consider that media played the most important role in these 
revolutions, while others see the military as the prime factor that impacted the fate of the 
regime, and some scholars believe that civil society and social movements played the most 
important role in any regime breaking down. The findings from the variety of academic and 
peer-reviewed research that studied these revolutions and their consequences show a 
considerable emphasis on the potentially important role of social and civil movements and 
actors in the breakdown of authoritarian regimes. In addition to this central question, the 
thesis will investigate how geopolitical and domestic factors contribute to revolutionary 
movements. 
 
1.2.1 Importance of the research 
The importance of this research lies in the fact that it helps us to understand the 
expected results of any revolution that possesses similar characteristics to the Egyptian and 
Polish revolutions. As we can observe that there is no one specific trigger for the Arab 
Spring in general, and mainly Egypt, thus this paper will examine the main role of the 
social movements and civil society actors. A natural question arises as to why I chose to 
compare Egypt, a Middle Eastern country, to Poland, which is in Eastern Europe. What 
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links the two different countries? As we know, Poland was the first Eastern European 
country to witness mass revolts against the communist regime, and this revolution was able 
to succeed after a long series of demonstrations and civil strikes that were mainly 
represented by the workers under the umbrella of the non-governmental organization 
Solidarity. A key trigger for the start of the revolution was the visit of Pope John Paul the 
Second, a Polish national, and the speech that he gave in front of hundreds of thousands, 
calling for freedoms, civil rights, and opposing violence: this pushed the workers to oppose 
the government and call for new reforms.  
On the other hand, there are many common issues between both the Solidarity 
movement and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, and the other civil NGOs that played a very 
important role in the Egypt’s revolution, as they were targeting people to help them achieve 
their social goals. In addition, both Poland and Egypt went through similar situations that 
led to a revolution, namely dire social conditions leading to a huge number of people on the 
ground asking for the removal of the regime. In both countries the revolution succeeded in 
toppling the regime. Both countries also experienced post-revolution elections but with 
some small differences.  
My goal in choosing Poland and Egypt is to compare how both revolutions were 
able to succeed, the factors that played major roles in them, and to what extent the two 
countries were able to reach democracy. The Arab Spring uprisings had many aspects that 
previous revolutions and protests did not, such as the large influence of social media; 
therefore it is essential to analyze how civil society impacted the Egyptian revolution by 
comparing it to the Polish revolution that took place in 1989. In this thesis I select the main 
civil society actors and social movements that played important roles during the Egyptian 
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revolution and compare them to the Polish revolution and how social movements there 
were able to reach their goals.   
1.3 Methodology 
This thesis adopts the comparative approach to explain the function of each factor as it 
exists in each case study.  In this paper, I also shed light on the framework in which societal 
change takes place and the reasons that caused dramatic change in the case of the two 
revolutions. I will consider the role of institutions in shaping behavior and the rationality 
behind many of the actions and initiatives taken by the activists in both the cases of Egypt 
and Poland. I focus on each case independently and then compare them to highlight their 
relationships to the different circumstances, influential factors and socio-political 
environments. I look at facts which will assist us to understand the effects of each of the 
conditions: social, political and economic. I rely primarily on secondary sources of 
references from books, articles, and presentations. The qualitative research technique is the 
major instrument throughout the paper, in order to be able to answer the research question. 
In addition I incorporate information from interviews with political activists in both 
countries that help me to have the facts that were taking place on the ground and that will 
explore the national track toward democratization in both countries.   
During the past few decades, a number of regions around the globe went through 
critical democratization and transition efforts which had varied levels of success, notably in 
the ex-Soviet Union States. Yet, an “exception” to these efforts was the Arab World. 
Politicians and analysts, even the dictators of the Arab world themselves, often highlighted 
a “zero-sum” equation, which explains that any attempt to overthrow their regimes may 
result in a degree of pluralism, but would also bring with it a great deal of instability. Any 
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removal of a dictatorship would simply find a dominant political Islam as the only 
substitute. However, as a result of a weakening economic reality and an accumulated 
political oppression, the Arab Spring emerged, and was seen as a kind of awakening and 
rising up of the hitherto dormant Arab civil societies. What happened resulted in a new 
system whereby the conventional protagonists were no longer the only actors in the 
political arena, but rather a wider space opened up for the youth groups in Arab societies 
(which constitute the majority of the population), accompanied with and supported by civil 
society organizations which both played a critical role through influential and empowered 
roles in the various spheres of public life.  
Over the decades, Arab rulers created a socio-political environment which included 
several security apparatuses and restrictive laws that pervaded and monitored every aspect 
of civic life and that kept all possible opposition forces fragmented and weak; yet, it is 
these same targeted forces which broke through the rigid political wall and led to the 
collapse of at least three Arab regimes in less than a year. As a result of the organizational, 
lobbying, awareness and mobilization efforts of civil society organizations and youth 
groups in Arab societies such as Egypt, citizens that for years had been passive and 
disconnected eventually became involved, active and key players in the electoral process. 
1.4 Thesis Map 
This section describes the four remaining chapters in the thesis. In addition I will be 
describing the motivation behind the research. The first chapter describes the elements 
behind the thesis; chapter two represents the existing literature on the different conditions 
that vary between the roles of civil society organizations tackling the domestic and 
geopolitical factors behind the two revolutions. This chapter provides a detailed 
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background about the different theories on the role of civil society organizations and factors 
behind the two revolutions.  It will also summarize work done on these areas to reveal how 
each theory is interconnected with the other to form an indicator in shaping the final 
outcome of the transition.  
Chapter three provides an overview of the events leading to the radical political 
changes that took place in Eastern Europe during the 1980s, with a particular emphasis on 
Poland. It traces specific periods in Poland’s political transformation: the workers’ strike of 
1980, the martial law of 1981 and finally the roundtable talks of the late 1980s which 
eventually led to Poland’s independence from the Soviet Union.  
Chapter four introduces the background behind the Egyptian revolution. The 
background to Egypt’s regime is explored, demonstrating many strong similarities with the 
case of Poland, with the exception of the length of the time required to overthrow the 
Mubarak regime completely. This chapter shows that, similarly to Poland, both domestic 
and geopolitical factors combined to fuel the populist movements in Egypt over the years 
leading to the break-up of the regime. These movements were supported by international 
players and led by civil society organizations and youth groups that resorted to non-violent, 
street-based initiatives that put increasing pressure on the ruling class and its forces, leading 
to the quick break-up.  The role of civil society and youth groups will be discussed in detail 
in this chapter, with a discussion on their evolution over the years in Egyptian society, 
influence on the youth in Egypt, and the support which these movements received from 
foreign parties and organizations. 
The findings of the thesis highlight the critical role of youth groups and civil society 
organizations in the breakdown of regimes, with a specific focus on Egypt and Poland. 
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These findings shed light on the answers to the research questions: How did civil society 
and non-governmental groups in Egypt and Poland contribute to regime breakdown? What 
specific roles did they have with regard to the regime breakdown? Such questions are 
important to answer, in order to explain how the power for change is actually rooted in the 
people and society. These findings reveal that the role of CSOs and youth groups was not 
sudden or limited to the 2011 events. In fact, decades before these groups exerted efforts on 
multiple levels to increase the civic awareness and education of the activists and youth 
groups, in addition to continuous lobbying of the state towards enacting human rights laws 
and regulations. The continuous years of suppression and one-man-rule led to an 
accumulation of public dissent and frustration, which helped to fuel and mobilize the 
protests in significantly large numbers. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
This chapter begins with an introduction, which will give an overview of the developing 
events leading to the revolutions in Poland and Egypt. Then the chapter  reviews some of 
the major themes and debates on the role of social movements and civil society actors in 
regime breakdown. The following part, which is the primary focus of the chapter, 
emphasizes the literature on the domestic and geopolitical factors that stimulate and seem 
to lead to regime breakdown. The chapter next examines the theories on democratic 
transition, and theories on regime breakdown. Lastly, this chapter discusses the 
democratization process and the main economic, social and civic factors that lead to the 
democratization of a certain society. 
2.1 Introduction 
On October 16, 1978 John Paul the Second was elected as Pope of the worldwide Catholic 
Church. A year later he visited Poland and gave a speech in the presence of hundreds of 
thousands calling for freedom and preserving human rights and going against violence 
(Mason, 1989). These calls for change represented a symbol for the Polish public. By 1976 
demonstrations by workers took place at Radom and Ursus leading to the emergence of 
many opposition groups consisting of workers and intellectuals, such as the Workers 
Defense Committee (KOR).  These groups used to clandestinely publish books and 
publications on their ideas and activities as well as describing how to demonstrate more 
effectively, and to establish links with the Western press and other Polish intellectuals to 
spread the news of what was happening in Poland. These publications and groups formed 
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the beginnings out of which the Solidarity movement arose, which represented the first civil 
society organization and subsequently the first social movement during the Polish 1989 
revolution. 
Not long after Pope John Paul the Second’s visit, striking workers on the Baltic 
coast formed a committee to present their demands to the government. They wanted to 
reflect a united front, so suggested Solidarity as a name and it soon became the symbol of 
the workers. Solidarity started as a non-governmental trade union in August 1980 led by 
Lech Walesa who was a factory technician at the Gdansk shipyards. It later spread to other 
workplaces and constituted the first independent labour union According to Bartkowski 
(2009), the rapid growth of the Solidarity movement, which saw it reach around 10 million 
members in a short space of time, was perceived as such a threat by the government that it 
imposed martial law in 1981 in order to crush the union. However, in 1984, faced with the 
reality of the failure of martial law to achieve its goal of destroying the union, the 
communist government released Solidarity leaders from prison. Throughout the intervening 
years, the Solidarity movement had been able to survive and had replaced the imprisoned 
leaders, in many cases assigning leadership roles to women who were able to take the 
movement beyond the shipyard and other more male-dominated spaces.  
However, while the government was not able to crush Solidarity, the movement was 
still not able to replace the government in power.  Between 1982 and 1988 the economic 
situation in Poland deteriorated significantly, leading to massive demonstrations in the 
streets. In response, the government found that it had no option but to start directly 
communicating with Solidarity. The establishment of direct communication resulted in the 
re-legalization of the trade union movement and the opening of negotiations during which 
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Solidarity was tasked with ensuring non-violent strikes and the support of the Catholic 
Church. By the end of the 1980s, these negotiations would lead Solidarity to accept a 
transition process.   Dialogue officially began in the form of the roundtable talks in Warsaw 
that took place from February 6 to April 4 1989; on April 17 1989 Solidarity was legalized.   
During the talks Solidarity and the government agreed to allocate one third of the 
parliamentary lower house to the Communist Party and one third to Solidarity with the 
remaining third to be decided upon by voting.  It was through this election process that 
Solidarity took the majority of seats in the house, automatically giving it the right to select 
its own prime minister, ushering in the first non-communist prime minister for more than 
40 years. In December 1989 the Polish parliament voted for amendments to the constitution 
to liberalize the economy and rename the country as the Republic of Poland. In 1990 Lech 
Walesa succeeded in reaching the presidency of the state leading to the abolishment of the 
communist governmental system. 
On December 17, 2010, at 11.30 am, Tunisian citizen Mohammad Bouazizi set 
himself on fire in front of the Sidi Bouzeid Municipality, in protest at the confiscation of 
his vegetable cart, the income from which used to feed his eight-member family. This event 
was a turning point in the Tunisian and Arab political scene that led to a break in the 
pervading fear of political oppression and social injustice. The impact of the Jasmine 
Revolution, as it went on to be known in Tunisia and across the world, affected the whole 
region and played a vital role, from Libya to Egypt, and from Yemen to Bahrain and Syria, 
in igniting bottom-up revolutions that called for a change to the political regimes; all of 
these shared the common chant of “the people want to bring down the regime”.  
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Egypt’s transition from a monarchy to a republic took place when General 
Muhammad Najib assumed power in Egypt in 1953. In 1981, Hosni Moubarak assumed 
power and until today he is considered to have ruled Egypt for the longest time since 
Muhammad Ali’s rule during the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the thirty-year rule of 
Mubarak was ended after large mass movements in Tahrir Square, Cairo, organized open 
protests lasting around eighteen days. The social upheavals that occurred in Egypt became 
“grass-roots movements that could not be contained, negotiated with, or controlled through 
a few leaders” and that is why Mubarak’s regime was toppled (Murphy 2011). Forced to 
resign after making many promises of reform, Mubarak left the presidential palace on the 
11th of February 2011.  
There are a couple of points worth noting concerning the uprisings in the Middle 
East. The process of the uprising itself witnessed a leaderless movement whereby different 
factions from society such as civilians, military personnel, political, un-political, religious, 
and un-religious parties came together. Nevertheless, when the primary objective of the 
uprising, ousting the dictator, was accomplished, the case shifted towards domestic 
disputes, driven along sectarian, ethnic, ideological, military divisions in society. Since the 
outbreak of the popular uprising in Egypt, many scholars have tried to answer several 
questions in an attempt to understand this unique Middle Eastern phenomenon. What are 
the main reasons that led to the massive popular uprising in Egypt? And most importantly, 
how were the demonstrations that toppled Mubarak’s regime carried out for the period of 
eighteen consecutive days?  
The causes that ignited and shaped the outbreak of social movements in Egypt are 
various. The protests led by exasperated demonstrators began as a reaction to poverty, 
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unemployment, corruption, and repression and were thus considered to be protests against 
Mubarak’s regime. Nevertheless, Amin (2003) believes that one of the pivotal reasons 
behind the massive uprising in Egypt lies in societal development. Moreover, later political 
gains made by religious movements indicate the well-organized structure of these 
movements’ preparations and mass legitimacy. These Islamic movements championed the 
revival of Islamic rule but with moderation. This attitude led the American Administration 
to accept and consider the political reality in a similar fashion to Turkish ‘moderated 
Islamic’ rule. In addition, a number of civil society actors played a very important role at 
the center of Egypt’s revolution. As the Jasmine Revolution began to take shape in Tunisia, 
these Egyptian movements sought to mobilize their followers through new methods. This 
mobilization was based on two main demands, asking for economic and political rights, 
which led to new campaigns that called for an end to corruption.  
The Kefaya movement was among the first to be launched as an opposition 
movement against Mubarak’s regime. It roots date back to fall 2004, and focused on 
dissatisfaction with the Egyptian regime’s grip on political power. The 2005 presidential 
elections in Egypt, at which point the idea of inheritance of presidential power from Hosni 
Mubarak to his son Gamal was introduced, provided a major impetus to the movement. 
Eventually Kefaya evolved into a movement that sought to tackle all of the corruption 
issues in the Egyptian government. The April 6 youth movement was the first to originate 
as a Facebook group, with its goal being to mobilize civilians for a nationwide protest in 
support of the workers of El-Mahalla El-Kobba in 2008. After this event the April 6 
movement enlarged its scope to fight for human and civil rights for Egyptians, calling for 
freedom of speech, an end to corruption, and many other social demands. The formation of 
the We Are All Khaled Said movement proved to be a turning point for Egypt’s civil 
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society. The movement stems from when 27 year-old Khaled Said was beaten to death, 
allegedly by security forces, in Alexandria in June 2010. The group reflects Egyptian 
solidarity over Khaled’s fate, whereby Khaled is seen as a symbolic son of any Egyptian 
family, thus inspiring the need to revolt against the status quo in Egypt.  
One of the biggest questions today regarding the Egyptian revolution relates to the 
role of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood has a long history, dating back 
to the early 1900s, with its origins rooted in opposition and including episodes of violence. 
It came to be seen as the de facto opposition of the political status quo, but was unable to 
reach any position of legitimate power until the 2012 presidential elections when its 
candidate Mohammad Morsi was elected president. In the revolution that ousted President 
Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood reinforced its centrist position by encouraging young 
people to organize mass protests, and calling for all groups to unite against Mubarak’s 
regime. The historical background of the Muslim Brotherhood shows the extent to which 
the group has evolved over time. The Muslim Brotherhood is aware that it was not the 
instigator of, nor the main actor in, the January uprisings, yet it was the most organized 
group and recognized the valuable role of youth in enforcing the balance of power and 
organizing the protests. With its new generation of young leaders, the Muslim Brotherhood 
reached a point where it recognized the need to cooperate with other opposition groups. 
The silent majority in Egypt (which consists mainly of movements drawn from middle-
class citizens as students, activists and professionals) was not as institutionalized as the 
Muslim Brotherhood, thus enabling the Muslim Brotherhood to attain political power more 
easily.  
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When considering the Muslim Brotherhood’s actions during the January revolution 
from a historical perspective, it becomes clear that its careful approach to the protests 
formed an extension of the group’s strategy of the past decades. This strategy exhibits a 
preference for incremental rather than revolutionary change; it is cautious and pragmatic, 
built on close cooperation with other Egyptian political actors. The role played by the 
Muslim Brotherhood in demonstrations was limited, and included an official abstention 
from participation in the so-called day of rage, based on the possibility of it constituting a 
failed revolution.  
However, on Friday January 28, the Muslim Brotherhood did participate, albeit 
remaining in the background. In the words of one of its leaders: “We are not pushing this 
movement, but we are moving with it. We don’t wish to lead it but we want to be part of it” 
(CITE). As the revolution continued to spread, especially outside Egypt, the Muslim 
Brotherhood went out of its way to make assurances that its aim was not to dominate 
Egypt’s post-Mubarak political scene. When viewed from the historical context of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, this assurance reflects a persistent fear of being part of a failed 
revolution which could result in its leaders being imprisoned. Likewise, the Muslim 
Brotherhood was equally afraid to be the leaders of a successful revolution that could be 
perceived as a continuation of its historical eagerness to take power.  
Civil society and social movements have existed for many years, but have also 
changed to reflect the era or circumstances in which they spring to life. This section will 
explore various definitions of theories for social movements and civil society, by referring 
to a number of scholars such as Huricihan Islamoglu (2001) who is a specialist in civil 
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society movements, and Anthony Giddens (1991) who has published research on social 
movements. 
Defining a social movement can be a hard task. It is not a well-organized, official 
political party or interest group that has a formal admission to political power, but at the 
same time it is not a group of political elites, nor is it an unorganized group without goals. 
Instead the answer is it is somewhere in between (Freeman & Johnson, 1999). The 
characteristics of social movements are that they are “involved in conflictual relations with 
clearly identified opponents; are linked by dense informal networks; [and they] share a 
distinct collective identity” (De la Porta & Diana, 2006, p.20). Social movements are 
involved in institutional struggles that oppose their goals. These goals can be narrow on a 
policy level or broad on a national level seeking cultural changes. Throughout history many 
social movements emerged to be the pretext to transform societies from the initial basis on 
which were established, but not succeeding every time. The movements embraced different 
ideologies: some aimed for revolutions and some for reforms, others were more 
conservative refusing any changes in society. The global changes and effects social 
movements were able to achieve led scholars to spend a lot of time analyzing the origin of 
these movements, their participants, and their methods to reach their goals or to lead them 
to failure. Eventually they reached the conclusion that in order to exist they must have 
resources and that they go through many stages in order to be able to develop.  
Herbert Blumer, one of the important scholars to study social movements, 
recognized four stages of a social movement’s lifecycle. The titles he gave to the four 
stages were “social ferment”, “popular excitement”, “formalization,” and 
“institutionalization” (De la Porta & Diani 2006, p.150). Throughout time scholars gave 
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these stages new names but the meanings remained relatively the same. These stages are 
emergence, coalescence, bureaucratization and decline. As mentioned previously, social 
movements may experience declines and do not necessarily succeed every time. There are 
different causes that can lead to the decline stage, and these include repression, co-optation, 
success, failure and mainstream. 
Huricihan Islamoglu argues in Civil Society, Concept and History Of (2001) that 
civil society is coterminous with the state as its power relations are ordered through law and 
institutions with the goal of ensuring social harmony. Additionally, civil society is a self-
regulating, self-governing body outside and often in opposition to the state representing 
both the nexus of societal associations expected to generate civility, social cohesion and 
morality, and the site of reciprocal economic relations among individuals engaged in 
market exchange activity (Islamoglu, 2001:1891). The point that Islamoglu wants to make 
is that civil society is a self-entity responsible for political issues, but at the same time it is a 
phenomenon that exists independently of the state. For Robin Cohen and Paul Kennedy, 
civil society “are engaged in expressing their members’ interests and trying to shape 
national political culture” (Cohen and Kennedy, 2007:71).  
Civil society components such as the middle-lower class, and more institutionalized 
social movements such as labour unions, played a very important role during the Polish and 
Egyptian revolutions. On April 6, 2008 the protests in the Egyptian city of Mahallah that 
called for a general strike had economic roots with rising food prices and the low wages of 
workers within the state textile industry causing a revolt. This labour movement of April 
2008 represented the progenitor of the later January revolution that played out in Tahrir 
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Square according to labour activist Kamal Fayoumi in an article on the labour movement 
and the future of democracy in Egypt (2012). 
In the January revolution of 2011 the activists were united by the phrase “everyone 
was in Tahrir”; this was different to the opposition movements of the 1990s that were the 
preserve of the Islamic groups. In 2011 Egypt witnessed a huge change when its educated 
youth united on the basis of common and shared interests from all civil societies and social 
movements. The We Are All Khaled Said movement provided a catalyst for everyone to 
take to the streets in Alexandria, for example.   Throughout history many countries 
witnessed historical changes as a result of a revolution. Some of these cases of upheaval 
were able to culminate in a peaceful process of democratization, while some experienced 
violent struggles to reach democracy, and others failed and were repressed by regimes, 
unable to reach any democratic solutions. In order for these revolutions to succeed and 
reach their goals, certain actors within each society must play vital roles. Social movements 
and civil society actors are the major catalysts for the successful mobilization to lobby for 
certain ideologies. At the same time, two crucial factors can play a role in the failure or 
success of any revolution, namely domestic and geopolitical factors. To this end, social 
movements and civil society actors are supported (or weakened) by any number of 
variables on the domestic and geopolitical levels. 
2.2 Role of social movements and civil society    
   
2.2.1 Social movements 
Building on previous discussion, social movements are involved in institutional struggles 
with agents that oppose their goals. These goals can be narrow, such as on a policy level, or 
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broad, such as on a national level seeking cultural changes. A number of early scholars 
tried to explain why people unite in a collective body in order to form a social movement. 
Throughout history many social movements emerged to form the pretext for a 
transformation of societies from the initial basis on which they were established, with 
varying degrees of success and failure. Ideologies varied: some aimed for revolutions and 
others for reforms, while some were conservative and refused any changes in society. 
However, the global achievements of social movements have led scholars to 
dedicate a large amount of time to analysing the origin of these movements, their 
participants, and methods used. The general conclusion is that social movements do not 
arise out of a vacuum: in order to exist they must have resources and they go through many 
stages to be able to develop.  
 
2.2.1.1 Four stages of social movements 
Herbert Blumer describes the first stage of social movement as the “social ferment” stage 
(De la Porta & Diani, 2006). Social movements at this level are in their intermediate 
starting phase and lack organization. The common point between the participants is that 
they are dissatisfied with the social conditions, and looking for a means to take action on 
this issue. These actions take place on an individual rather than collective level. The second 
stage represents the level where social movements start to overcome some of the problems 
they faced during the first stage. This stage is known as the popular stage, as it reflects the 
move from individual unrest to a collective society feeling distressed by a certain issue and 
the root cause of it. Rex D. Hopper (1950) argued that at this stage “unrest is no longer 
covert, endemic, and esoteric; it becomes overt, epidemic and exoteric. Discontent is no 
longer uncoordinated and individual; it tends to become focalized and collective” (p. 273). 
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At this stage, participants become aware of one another, general policies and strategies are 
drafted and the means to implement them in order for their movement to succeed.  
Blumer defines the third stage as formalization (De la Porta & Diani, 2006), or 
bureaucratization. At this stage, organization occurs at higher levels and strategic coalitions 
take place, whereby the movements succeed in reaching public awareness, requiring 
coordination between all the other movements in order to better address their common 
goals. This is set and reached through a professional staff that organizes daily operations 
and activities. At this stage their political power is stronger than previous stages, giving 
them access to the political elite, and the opportunity to run for political posts. The last 
stage is the institutionalization phase during which social movements, as Miller (1999) 
discussed, decline due to one of four reasons, namely repression, co-optation, success or 
failure.  
When a social movement reaches institutionalization, the point at which it is most 
developed, it may face state repression, during which authorities will try to destroy it. 
Miller (1999) mentioned that “repressive actions may be defined as legitimate by the state, 
but they are never legitimate from the perspective of the movement”. When a social 
movement faces such actions, it is hard for it to mobilize and attract new members. 
Cooptation is also one of the stages that may hit a social movement when institutionalized. 
When a movement becomes centralized, and revolves around a charismatic leadership, co-
optation occurs, and its leaders end up collaborating with the legal authorities.  
In addition, when movements succeed in their goals, this can affect their status. 
According to Miller, some social movements re-orient to new goals once they achieve their 
old goals. Also once the called-for goals and rights are adopted within the political system, 
there would be no need for the social movement itself. Miller (1999) argues that sometimes 
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social movements would not be able to co-opt with their rapid development, thus they may 
collapse into different factions.  
2.2.1.2 General social movement literature  
With the emergence of the middle class in the 1960s, states started witnessing so-called 
post-industrial social movements. There was a general sense of awareness, with each 
citizen seeking to have an independent opinion within the decision-making apparatus. The 
background of social movement lies in anti-materialism and giving the power back to the 
people (Cohen and Kennedy, 2007). 
Anthony Giddens (1938) provided the inspiration for social movements during the 
period of modernity that he called “emancipatory politics”, when people struggle to reach 
their goals of freedom because of the inequalities they face. Giddens argued that “it is a 
politics of choice, while emancipatory politics is a politics of life chances, life politics is a 
politics of lifestyle.” (Giddens, 1991) For Giddens life politics is when social movements 
know what to do with the “emancipatory rights” once they are achieved. Hence we find 
different definitions of social movements: some see them as organized, structured groups, 
while others see them as disorganized and unpredictable. It is fair to conclude that both 
definitions are correct, but that it depends on the case in question and the period of time. 
Hence in some places social movements are effective and in others they are spontaneous 
and reactionary.   
John Wilson argues in his 1973 book Introduction to Social Movements that “a 
social movement is a conscious, collective, organized attempt to bring about or resist large-
scale change in the social order by non-institutionalized means” (Wilson, 1973).  Other 
theorists define social movements as unpredictable, chaotic, and disorganized (Byrne, 
1997). According to Wiktorowicz (2003), if social movements are effective in a certain 
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state, it is not necessary to be effective in another one. While in some states there is a wide 
scope for social movements to be active, such as in Western nations, in other states social 
movements may be repressed by the authorities and unable to mobilize for their goals or to 
recruit members.  
Social movements have a number of core characteristics. First they try to put 
pressure on power holders in order to reach their goals. Second they try to promote and 
mobilize their goals among the public in order to achieve their support, and recruit them to 
their organization. One of the most important contemporary theories is the ‘resource 
mobilization’ theory, whereby social movements are evaluated as organized. This theory 
introduces the organized process through which individual or collective initiatives turn into 
social movements. The theory concentrates on the cause of mass mobilization, where 
psychological discomfort leads to a change in the situation through collective action. 
(Wiktorowicz, 2003)  This theory studies actions that social movements take and the 
leadership process, arguing that this process plays a vital role in social mobilization, and 
that well organized demonstrations need a successful leadership in order to reflect and 
attain the relevant goals.  
Through the examination of both civil society and social movements, an analysis of 
the link between them can be made. The relationship between both of them is positive, 
whereby civil society secures the networks that social movements need in order to advance. 
Cohen and Kennedy (2007) argue that social movements are key agents for social change. 
Social movements are, as previously stated, a group of actions taken to reach a state of 
social transformation, while civil society encompasses actions taken before this, and, being 
separate from the state, attract people with common goals, who will lead the social 
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movements of the future. According to The Sociology Guide (2011), “civil society 
initiatives and social movements are social processes which undergo several stages of 
progression from mobilization to intensive collective action.” 
 
2.3 Domestic and geopolitical variables 
For any revolution to start, many factors must be in place to provide the impetus for 
demonstrations to continue. Domestic and geopolitical factors both have an impact on the 
political situation of any state, and can shape whether a revolution or any kind of 
demonstrations will occur. 
 
2.3.1 Domestic variables 
2.3.1.1 The Military’s Role in Democratic Transition 
According to Justin Clardie (2010), the role of the military in the transition to democracy 
has reached the point that any new democratic government must give priority to its civilians 
to control the role of the army. Thus we can clearly see that the military has a strong effect 
on any democratic transition that may take place. According to Clardie (2010), there are 
two schools of thought: one places a large importance on increasing resources and support 
for the army during any transition, while the second favors decreasing support for the 
military under any kind of transition. 
Clardie (2010) gives two reasons to justify an increase in support to the military, 
with “placate the military” being one of them. During any transition, there will be people 
for the transition and others against, and this makes it essential for the new government to 
have the military on its side (Clardie, 2010). Military leaders may perceive the democratic 
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transition as a negative scenario in which the army loses power, thus the new government 
has to pre-empt this and avoid any potential coup to regain military power. Increasing 
government support for the army is one tactic to circumvent this scenario. 
Huntington (1991) argues that it is in the government’s interest to support the army 
by providing better basic needs, such as housing and allowances, and increasing its budget. 
Ensuring “domestic stability in the post-transition democratic environment” is the second 
reason for increasing military resources (Clardie, 2010). This is because the state could face 
chaos during the phase of transition, due to tribal or ethnic conflicts, leading the whole 
country to political instability. Therefore, governments need to have a unified military 
power to ensure stability, and promote the legitimacy of the government taking control 
(Makara, 2012).  
The second school of thought that Clardie mentiones tends to decrease the resources 
of the army in order to achieve a democratic transition. This school of thought is also based 
on two reasons for justification. The first is that the new government might fear military 
intervention in the country’s internal politics, if it has sufficient resources to enable it to 
play such a role (Clardie, 2010). This implies it is in the new government’s interest to 
decrease and limit the resources of the army to render it incapable of playing a big role 
within domestic politics (Cawthra & Luckham, 2003). At the same time, economic 
concerns could push the new government to decrease military resources (Clardie, 2010).  
The saved resources could then be reallocated to improve education and social welfare, 
which would help to consolidate the new democratic regime in the country (Haggard & 
Kaufman, 1995).   
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For Clardie (2010), these factors would ensure the legitimacy of the government. 
However, any new government must be careful to ensure that increasing resources does not 
lead to social injustice as this would be an obstacle on the road toward democratization. 
Thus it is imperative that the military and new government have a good relationship for 
democracy to flourish. The reaction of the military is a determining factor in whether the 
transition of the country toward democracy will be peaceful. With the military on the 
government’s side, it is free to focus on stability and economic reforms. If the military sees 
the democratic transition as a bad process for the country, this will lead to a clash between 
all society components, resulting in violent acts and struggles among all players.   
2.3.1.2 Civil society role in democratic transition 
The origin of civil society for Aristotle, as defined in his Politike Koinonia is as follows:  
“As a Public, ethical-political community of free and equal citizens under legally 
defined system of rule. Law itself, however, was seen as the expression of an ethos, 
a common set of norms and values defining not only political procedures but also a 
substantive form of life based on a developed catalogue of preferred virtues and 
forms of interaction” (Cohen & Arato, 1992, p.84). 
According to Aristotle’s definition, we can argue that civil society has played a vital role in 
political life for a long time. However, the World Bank offers a definition of civil society 
that is more helpful for investigating the current topic: To the wide array of non-
governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, 
expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, 
political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations 
(CSOs) therefore refer to a wide array of organizations: community groups, non-
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governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable 
organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundation (2010). 
According to Gideon Baker (2002), there is a clear relationship between civil 
society and democratic regimes. In addition, from the definitions above, we can analyze 
that civil society plays a role between both the public and private sector (Sean Yom, 2005). 
Yom (2005) argues that civil society is an essential tool for a democratic transition, and can 
be related to this transition in many different ways, both internally and externally. Booker 
Magure (2008) considered that “internally civil society engenders cooperation, solidarity, 
public spiritedness and trust (develops social capital) while externally it calls for a limited 
government that is responsive and accountable to its citizenry”. Even though the goals of 
civil society actors are for the common good, there are different interpretations of what 
constitutes common good (Kocka, 2004). Civil society has the ability to impact 
governmental decisions, thus the public uses civil society as a means to ask for demands 
and be heard by the government. This implies that civil society is essential for any 
democratic process, as it organizes and prepares the environment for such a process 
(Kocka, 2004).  
As previously mentioned, civil society actors play the role of mediator between the 
public and private spheres, and subsequently have a very important role in setting scenarios 
under any kind of transition. In addition, civil society can play a role whereby it pushes 
citizens to ask for its demands and ensures good relations between the state and its 
civilians, in an attempt to avoid a violent transition and preserve a peaceful transition. Also 
civil society plays a role in supervising corrupt officials, and ensures accountability, thus it 
is important in any state to have civil society, as its absence would lead governments to 
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suppress calls for reform, and would lead to a violent transition amid the call for 
democratization. In conclusion, the world “civil” means acceptance of others and 
promoting diversity, thus civil society represents a third sector, which exists and plays a 
role between the public and private sectors that calls for human and civil rights through 
peaceful means.  
 
2.3.1.3 Social media’s role in democratic transition 
Authoritarian regimes have long used media as a tool to spread their ideologies and control 
information. However, innovations in technology have made it harder, and nigh on 
impossible, for authoritarian regimes to control the flow of information. Kaplan and 
Heinlein (2010) argue that developments in media have had huge effects on the democratic 
transition process. They identified six types of new media:  
1. Blogs (Twitter, celebrity blogs) 
2. Collaborative projects (Wikipedia) 
3. Content communities (YouTube) 
4. Virtual game worlds ( EverQuest) 
5. Social networking sites (Facebook, Instagram) 
6. Virtual social worlds (Second Life) 
Social media theory is the most important that shows the effect of social media on political 
change in any country. Hank Johnston (2011) defines social movements as:  
“Social Movements are Made up of multiple organizations, as well as less formal 
groups, circles and non-affiliated individuals. Members and groups coalesce around 
an issue or grievance to make their demands known publicly, and show their force 
to representatives of the state in order to effect a change” (p. 13-4). 
  
27 
 
Thus, social media is an action carried out by citizens as a collective collaboration, trying to 
promote certain ideologies and pushing for governments to make changes. The social 
movement theory puts the public’s interests before those of the elite, and is always referred 
to as popular politics rather than elite politics (Johnston, 2011) 
A successful social movement needs an impactful campaign to promote its 
objectives and rally the public around them. Social media is ideal and necessary for a social 
movement, where people are mobilized through the role social media plays (Hackett & 
Adam, 1999). It is very hard for an authoritarian regime to control citizens, because social 
media users are no longer attached to government utilities, or affected by government 
propaganda. Indeed, social media opens up new ways for social communication that enable 
people to control information instead of it being controlled by the government.  
Robin Thompson (2011) argues that social media is different from the traditional 
media that we know, as “anyone with a cellphone can become a reporter and take a 
cellphone video of news while it’s happening” (p.171). Improvement in technology has 
spurred the development of media, and enabled people to organize discussions on different 
issues that states can no longer control.  “Facebook and Twitter actually welcome and 
encourage users to support causes for political and/or social change” (Thompson, 2011, 
p.168). 
Today, people do not need to be physically in the location where the revolution is 
taking place; they can revolt from anywhere, and expose regime corruption through social 
media, in many ways that traditional media cannot be used. As Manuel Castells (2009) 
writes: 
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“The powerful have been spying on their subjects since the beginning of history, but 
the subjects can now watch the powerful, at least to a greater extent than in the past. 
We have all become potential citizen journalists who, if equipped with a mobile 
phone, can record and instantly upload to the global networks any wrongdoing by 
anyone, anywhere”.(p. 413). 
Thus, social media nowadays challenges authoritarian regimes, via the actions of the 
masses that are able to mobilize information beyond the control of the regime. This kind of 
collective action created a new atmosphere in which the people pushed for reforms, and for 
their human and civil rights, in order to move to a democratic regime (Van Ham, 2010). 
Transition today is influenced greatly by social media, to the extent it determines if it is 
going to be peaceful or violent. People benefit from the easy access to information in order 
to organize themselves and stand against any authoritarian regime with the aim of 
overthrowing it.  
All in all, the new improvements in media and technological advancements have 
resulted in authoritarian regimes no longer being able to suppress citizens or to control any 
flow of information; in contrast, the absence of social media enhances authoritarianism, and 
impedes any requests for democratization, thus leading to violent acts. 
 
2.3.1.4 Economic disparity   
Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) argues that there is a strong relation between economic 
development and a nation’s transition towards democracy. As the economic situation 
improves, people ask for democratization. Such economic enhancements can spread 
democratic desires and ambitions over a wide range of people (Dahl, 1989; Huntington, 
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1991).  Two schools of thought argue that economic inequality leads to democratic 
transition or repression of the people that are seeking democracy. Edward Muller (1995) 
and Robert Dahl (1971) are among the prominent scholars that represent the first school of 
thought. This school of thought argues that authoritarian regimes do not move to 
democratization if there is extreme economic inequality, as they would not be willing to 
have an equal distribution of resources and wealth. For these regimes, the process of 
democratization would cost them more than that of preserving the economic imbalance in 
society.  
When economic disparity is particularly extreme, the cost of redistribution of wealth 
exceeds the cost for the regime to repress the revolts (Houle, 2010). Lipset (1959) and 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) are among the scholars that represent the second school of 
thought, in which it is argued that when regimes find the costs of redistribution to be low, 
they will tend to move toward democratization. When economic inequality is still at an 
intermediate level, people are more likely to revolt, and the ruling party will move toward 
democratization, due to the low cost of redistribution of resources. Therefore, regime is 
forced to democratize in order not to face any uprisings (Houle, 2010).  Economic disparity 
therefore is an indicator that can determine if the democratization process will be peaceful 
or violent. When there is economic equality, people will start seeking political freedoms, 
and life satisfaction. Likewise, the greater the level of economic equality, the better the 
educational system, and greater likelihood that people will seek peaceful ways toward 
democratization (Lipset, 1959) 
In contrast, when the gap between rich and poor is wider, this will lead to more 
violent processes in the quest for for social justice. Thus economic inequality impacts the 
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democratic transition greatly and the level of disparity determines to what extent the 
transition will be peaceful or violent. 
2.3.2 Geopolitics 
Geopolitics is defined as “the elements of discourse or social practice” which has the most 
important role in building international politics (Reuber, 2009; Agnew, 1998). “Classical 
geopolitics” represented the beginning of geopolitics in the late 19th century, whereby the 
focus was on how the geographical threat and opportunities affect international relations 
(Sparke, 2009). By the start of the 1970s geo-politicians became more concerned with 
“critical geopolitics” (Power & Campbell, 2010) in which they wanted to have a new 
concept and new construction of geopolitics as a “complex set of discourse, representation, 
and practice” (Power & Campbell, 2010). On the other hand there is a concentration by the 
post-structuralism that tend to show that geography is closely related to certain patterns of 
power and privilege in its imagining of the world (Scott, 2009). Moreover critical 
geographers, such as Hyndman (2009), argue that the greater powers are in a state of trust 
vis a vis the whole world, where they are accepted and can have influence on others. 
O’Tuathail (1996) defines critical geopolitics as “a small part of a much larger rainbow 
struggle to decolonize our inherited geographical imagination so that other geo-graphing 
and other worlds might be possible.” In addition critical geopolitics considers that in order 
to reach better understanding, there must be a clear view and identification as to the nature 
of each map (O’Tuathail & Dalby 1998).  
Dodds (2008) argues that even states that are not from the greatest powers can be 
geopolitical and influence others. Also O’Tuathail and Dalby (1998) segment geopolitics 
into three parts: popular, practical and formal. Formal and practical geopolitics are bound to 
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states, policy-makers and politicians while popular geopolitics is mainly attached to the 
influence of media, cinema, and art (O’Tuathail & Dalby, 1998). Many scholars specialized 
in geopolitics have analyzed how popular geopolitics influences the public. They did so by 
analyzing films and magazines, in order to prove how this form of media and other forms 
can fully reflect the ideologies of world politics, and how they can empower, sustain or 
weaken these ideologies (Dittmer & Dodds, 2008).  
2.4 The Democratization Process 
Now that we have discussed the various general factors affecting the political 
realities in states, it is important to discuss what would make a certain state or society 
democratic. First of all it is important to provide a general definition of democratization, 
and then examine the causes that eventually lead to democratization, and which, without 
them, a certain country, whether it was Egypt or Poland, cannot be considered truly 
democratic. 
First of all, according to Adam et al (2000), democratization is the process where a 
country or a regime transitions into a regime that is more democratic. It can be a radical 
transition from a regime that is authoritarian to one that is fully democratic, or to one that is 
semi-democratic, or a semi-authoritarian system to one that is fully democratic. The 
outcome may not always be uniform. It may sometimes face several reversals, like the case 
in Argentina or it can be consolidated as was the case in the United Kingdom. Ideally, the 
result of democratization should be to ensure that the citizens have full civil rights and 
human rights, primarily the right to have a voice in the political system and the right to vote 
that system into power or out of power. Yet, what are the factors that limit or allow 
democratization to prosper? The factors range from history to culture, economics, historical 
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and social factors. Among the most prominent factors are the following: education, wealth, 
social equality, middle class, civic society, civic culture. 
First of all, wealth has a strong correlation with democracy, because a country with 
a high GDP/capita has higher chances for democratization, which is why countries that 
have a wealthy society have rarely fallen into authoritarian rule after World War II (Adam, 
2000). Moreover, Frederico (2014) explains that empirical research leads many to consider 
than an economically developed society either helps democracies that are newly established 
to consolidate, or improves the chances for a transition to a democracy (Adam, 2000). 
Secondly, there is also a correlation between wealth and education, as Frederico (2014) 
explains that a population that is illiterate and poorly education may elect politicians that 
could be too populist and may abandon democracy very soon after their elections, and may 
even become dictators even if free elections are found (Adam, 2000). Then there is the 
“resource curse theory”, which suggests that democratization often fails in countries with 
significant natural resources like oil, because such resources become sources of support for 
the elite ruling class who depend on these sources to grow in power, as is the case in 
Nigeria, instead of depending on support from tax revenues, such is the case countries like 
Norway.  
On the other hand, the natural resource factor can work in the favor of 
democratization, as Frederico (2014) explains that the elites who used the funds from the 
oil resources to build their own physical capital and fortune would fear that their investment 
can be damaged as a result of a revolution, and so they would make concessions towards 
democratizing their system instead of facing a violent clash with their people (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2003). Moreover, a country having a market economy can be intrinsically linked 
to a market economy. This belief by Mousseau (2000) is centered on the notion that a 
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market economy and a democracy are two elements of freedom in a society. This is because 
a market economy with such a culture encourages norms like compromise, negotiations, 
equality before the law, respect before the law and all are considered supportive for a 
democratization process (Mousseau, 2000, Faria 2014). In addition, according to Acemoglu 
& Robinson (2006), democracy is more prevalent in egalitarian societies, and when the 
society is socially imbalanced and the distribution of power and wealth in the society is 
unequal, the masses have more incentives to revolt after years of accumulated inequality 
and social frustration.   
Then, there is the middle class factor. Acemoglu & Robinson (2006) argue that 
some models indicate that democracy flourishes when there is a substantial number of 
citizens that are in the range of intermediate wealth, as they are able to exert a stabilizing 
impact in the society. This can be explained by saying that when the upper class may wish 
to preserve its position through political power and the lower class may desire to lift itself 
up from the lower levels, the middle class comes in to balance the two extreme positions. 
Finally, the civil society factor is a critical indication of a democratized society. A civil 
society that is healthy includes academia, NGOs, unions and human rights organizations, 
among others, which are considered very critical for the democratization process because it 
gives a common purpose and unity to people, while providing them with a social network 
through which they challenge and organize movements towards the hierarchy of the state. 
What civic associations do is that they also prepare citizens for political participation in the 
future when a democratic system comes to light (Faria, 2014). Finally, social networks that 
are horizontally organized help in building trust among members of the public which is 
important for the function of democratic institutions (Faria, 2014) 
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To conclude, this chapter outlined the various events that culminated in the 
revolutions in Egypt and Poland, with the specific influential role played by civil society 
actors toward both regimes, fueled by geopolitical and domestic factors, such as the role of 
the military, that allowed to garner international support and backing for these movements, 
ultimately leading to the regime change in both countries. At the end we have discussed the 
main factors that lead to the democratization of a certain society from an economic, social, 
civic and educational perspective. The next chapter will go into detail on the specific 
developments leading to the regime breakdown in Poland, in addition to the role of the 
church and Pope John Paul the Second. 
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Chapter Three 
The Case of Poland 
From the Latin word ‘revolution’, which means ‘a turnaround’, a revolution is considered 
to be a radical type of change in the organizational structures or power which happens in a 
relatively brief period of time.  In Aristotle’s view, two types of political revolution exist: 
either a complete change from one constitutional state to another, or a major modification 
of an existing one.  Human history has witnessed a variety of revolutions in terms of 
duration, methods and the ideologies that fueled them. The main results of these revolutions 
have included significant changes in socio-political institutions, economy, culture and even 
geopolitical borders. As far as the topic of this thesis is concerned, the Arab Spring was a 
revolutionary wave of protests and demonstrations, both violent and non-violent, with 
events ranging from riots all the way to civil wars, as in the case of Syria. Taking Poland as 
a case study, this chapter first provides an overview of the events leading to the radical 
political changes that took place in Eastern Europe during the 1980s, with a particular 
emphasis on Poland. It traces specific periods in Poland’s political transformation, such as 
the workers’ strike of 1980, the martial law of 1981 and finally the roundtable talks of the 
late 1980s which eventually led to Poland’s independence from the Soviet Union. 
3.1 Introduction 
The late 1980s were a turning point for Eastern Europe, ushering in the start of the journey 
toward democracy. After the fall of communism in Poland, other communist states 
witnessed the fall of their own regimes in a domino effect. Country after country, people 
took to the streets to demand an end to communism and to begin a new era of democracy, 
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especially that people no longer considered one-party rule as legitimate. The events that 
took place after 1989 surprised the whole world; no one would ever have imagined that 
Poland, the Czech Republic, or Hungary, would cast off communism, or that the Berlin 
Wall would fall; all these events were the result of non-violent revolutions that swept 
Eastern Europe (Cipkowski, 1991). By 1989 Eastern and Central Europe witnessed non-
violent movements that ended the rule of the one-party system. The following year in 1990, 
these countries held free elections. When these communist governments faced the 
revolutions alone, without the support of the Soviet Union under the presidency of Mikael 
Gorbachev, the huge political pressures they faced domestically and geopolitically pushed 
them to surrender. This chapter will focus on the case of Poland during the revolution of 
1989, being the first country to revolt against communist rule.  
After the parliamentary elections in 1946, which were stolen by the communists, 
non-violent actions started to take place against the one-party rule. However it took more 
than 30 years for Polish society to unite and create social coalitions in order to better 
organize their strategies against the communist rule. The lack of unity among the social 
groups played a role in their failure; it took until the second half of the 1970s for the 
different groups opposing communism to unite and start organizing their activities for their 
common goal. Workers went onto the streets in 1956 asking for political and economic 
changes and were met with crushing brutality from the communist authorities. Students and 
intellectuals also organized demonstrations asking for the same goals, but these were 
silenced by the legal authorities who used their power against them. The start of the 1970s 
also witnessed demonstrations in which thousands of workers took to the streets in the 
coastal cities, asking for an improvement in living standards. After constitutional 
amendments in 1975 gave the Communist Party the leading role in Polish society, and high 
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inflation in 1976, workers, students, and intellectuals took to the streets, resulting in the 
arrest of hundreds of them. The Committee for the Defense of Polish Workers was 
established after the arrest of the workers, and acted as a fundraiser to pay for lawyers to 
defend the workers in court and support their families financially. The Movement for the 
Defense of Human and Civil Rights was initiated in order to supervise the communist 
government’s violation of the international law of human rights, to which it was a 
signatory. In 1977, the security serviced killed a 23 year-old anti-communist activist, which 
prompted the rise of student organizations independent of the Communist Party. By 1978 
and 1979, a clandestine form of education arose, which saw history and other subjects 
related to Polish society taught in church buildings, and an underground press for 
opposition groups, which published more than 400 publications.  
One key event that improved the opposition’s plans was the election of the Polish 
Cardinal Karol Wojtyla as Pope John Paul the Second in 1978. In 1979 he visited his native 
country where he gave a speech broadcast on TV and radio that focused on human rights 
and freedom of expression. This incident represented a turning point in the history of 
Poland that managed to mobilize society in its entirety, and bolstered participation in the 
demonstrations. All of the actions, demonstrations, committees and associations that were 
established by workers, intellectuals, students, and members of the Catholic Church 
represented a huge force that had the ability to bring change to Poland.  
While these events were taking place, the economic situation in Poland was 
deteriorating day by day, prompting massive demonstrations to take place. The Gdansk 
shipyard proved to be a galvanizing force, when the leader of the strikes there, a former 
factory worker with a highly charismatic personality, was able to establish the “free trade 
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union” called Solidarity. The Solidarity movement, which attracted almost 10 million 
members, was legalized in September 1980 and represented the first trade union in Eastern 
and Central Europe to be independent of communism. This trade union represented almost 
all workers in Poland, which was seen as a threat to the Soviet-backed government, and 
thus responded by implementing martial law in December 1981. Many of the Solidarity 
leaders along with other opposition activists were imprisoned as a result.  
However, this did not deter the movement, but rather forced it underground to be 
led by other opposition activists who were not detained. In particular, women played a 
major role in leading Solidarity’s underground press activities and organizing other 
departments within the movement. When the communist government realized it was not 
able to crush Solidarity, it released its leaders and canceled martial law. However, 
Solidarity was not yet strong enough to bring about a radical change in power; for this it 
had to wait until 1988 when Poland found itself in a position of deadlock between the 
opposition and the government and an increasingly dire economic situation.  This situation 
caused massive strikes to take place, which prompted the government to ask Solidarity for 
negotiations. Solidarity accepted the offer with the support of the Catholic Church, and 
moved toward a pacted transition, that would preserve the economic and social status of the 
ruling elite. As a result, roundtable discussions began, resulting in an agreement in June 
1989 to have a pacted parliament, which brought a huge victory for Solidarity. So it was 
that in August 1989, Eastern and Central Europe witnessed the first non-communist prime 
minister for many decades. 
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3.2 Poland’s road toward democracy 
Political unrest began in Poland after the end of World War II. The Soviet forces stayed on 
in Polish territory, bringing Poland into the Soviet sphere of influence. The death of Stalin 
represented for some liberalization from communism. Three years after his death, for 
example, in June 1956, a huge protest took place in Poznan, one of Poland’s largest cities. 
The protests constituted a revolt on the part of Poznan workers, after an agreement they 
signed with the Minister of Machine Industry was broken.  This was a brutal confrontation 
in which workers defended their rights aggressively against the police, chanting the slogan 
“freedom and bread”; the regime faced this revolt by suppressing it harshly, killing 
hundreds and arresting and imprisoning others. Yet the workers did not surrender to this 
reality, and over the years they used their jobs to paralyze the country: trains were stopped, 
official headquarters were set on fire, and huge industries were brought to a halt as well. 
Authorities faced these uprisings with brutality, killing hundreds. Although the state 
adopted some price decreases to ease the economic situation, workers who paralyzed the 
factories found themselves fired or imprisoned.  
3.2.1 The strike of the 1980s 
By April 1980, and after the calling for various reforms from opposition parties, the 
government announced a number of reforms regarding the economy and the state’s 
management in general. The government’s belief that an increase in food prices was 
necessary for growth was set out in a policy whose existence, it was hoped, would go 
unnoticed by the population at large.  In July 1980, workers took to the streets once again in 
massive numbers when the price of meat was doubled. The government tried to solve the 
problem by implementing certain temporary solutions that were designed to appease only 
the strikers and not all the citizens.   
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The demonstrators stuck to their demands calling for a decrease in prices and 
additional allowances for families as the benefits that the policemen and the military 
receive. At this time KOR tried to raise awareness among the strikers that increasing 
salaries would lead to more inflation, thus people should also recognize the need to ask for 
new trade union elections, and their constitutional rights. The July strikes were a turning 
point for politics in Poland. These strikes showed that the authorities were willing to 
negotiate with representatives from the demonstrators, neglecting the trade unions 
controlled by them. In addition these strikes reflected a high level of savviness among the 
workers, who were able to organize their activities in line with when it was advantageous to 
demonstrate and when it was more beneficial to give time for political negotiations to take 
place. During the July strikes KOR played an important role in organizing an information 
network, to gather news about the political situation on the ground, and send this 
information to Western media through Western journalists in Warsaw. It was crucial for 
Polish people to know what was going on, and equally for the West to know about the 
uprisings, especially that the official media did not report on the events at all. Workers at 
the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk started striking on August 14, 1980, calling for the rehiring 
of two workers whose employment had been terminated, Anna Walentynowicz and Lech 
Walesa, and at the same time asking for a wage increase. This was a critical point 
especially that the shipyard workers represent a very high respect to other workers due to 
the sacrifice they gave during the 1970 strikes. The strikers saw that they must negotiate, in 
order not to lose everything, and they saw that it was critical to unite to be stronger; a 
strategy of continuing the strikes worked in their favor to mobilize more people and call for 
democracy at the same time (National Defense University Press, Fort Lesley J. McNair, 
Washington, DC, 1985).  
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An Inter-factory Strike Committee (MKS) was initiated and tasked with addressing 
the demands of the workers, resulting in a paper of 21 demands being presented to the 
Communist Party, including a call to accept trade unions independent to the Communist 
Party, freedom of speech and the press, the rehiring of the workers that had been dismissed 
in 1970 and 1976, the reinstatement of students who had been expelled from their schools 
and colleges, and wage increases. The MKS was able to reach an agreement with the 
government on August 31, 1980, in which the government addressed some of the demands 
but not all of them. The government did not, for example, accept the right to 
demonstrations and free trade unions, but did implement some economic changes and allow 
some media freedoms. The MKS had to make certain sacrifices in the process, such as 
accepting the rule of the Communist Party.  
The events that took place in 1980 gave a lot of signs to the observers. The MSK 
represented the first alliance between workers seeking common goals, and the first unison 
between workers and intellectuals that were mobilizing on the same level and seeking the 
same objectives, thus the MSK represented a real alternative to Solidarity. The MSK was 
able to prove that the party was not the only organization to represent the workers; in 
addition it was able to release the trade unions from the control of the Communist Party, 
forcing the party to compete for the workers to join it. The workers were universally 
convinced that violence would not lead them anywhere, especially considering the bloody 
history they had been through. Thus the ‘Gdansk agreement’ represented a reference for 
them as the first peaceful accomplishment in a communist country (St. Martin’s Press, New 
York, 1983). 
  
42 
 
3.2.2 The 1981 imposition of martial law 
3.2.2.1 Polish Solidarity 
Between 1982 and 1988 the economic situation in Poland deteriorated greatly, which led to 
massive demonstrations in the streets, and forced the government to contact Solidarity. This 
resulted in the re-legalization of the trade union movement and opening of negotiations in 
which Solidarity had to ensure non-violent strikes and the support of the Catholic Church. 
These negotiations led Solidarity to accept the pacted transition. 
By the end of 1981, the situation in Poland was difficult, with Solidarity and the 
party unable to reach any type of agreement. Many strikes took place in different areas in 
Poland, One of these strikes in December 1981 at the Warsaw Firefighters Academy was 
crushed massively by the police, leading to the issuing of a paper to the party threatening a 
general strike if the government did not cease its violent acts (Andrews, 1985), 
The Council of State issued martial law in Poland on the night of December 12, 
1981. Solidarity leaders were arrested along with other student and farmer opposition 
activists. In addition, travel between cities was banned, meetings were forbidden, and many 
unions were outlawed. Moreover, the law closed many schools and universities, as well as 
the Solidarity offices, and militarized the radio and television channels. Prime Minister 
General Jaruzelski explained that martial law had been introduced as Solidarity’s political 
nature was destroying Polish society, and threatening the economy. Therefore, he reasoned, 
martial law would save the economy from devastation and preserve Poland’s position in the 
international community. Rather, martial law preserved the communist power in Poland, 
and was able to stifle the voice of Solidarity and its views.  
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However, there was huge resistance to martial law, with major strikes taking place 
in a number of large factories, although these were broken up by the military forces, 
resulting in many protestors being killed or wounded. Martial law faced a high level of 
resistance from Solidarity. Although the regimes tried to rebuild the system to attain 
economic growth, it failed to reach its goals. The economy and living standards remained 
stagnant. This situation lasted for eight years until the spring and summer of 1988, when 
continual strikes and confrontations between the party and Solidarity, ended with the party 
offering to negotiate with Solidarity represented by Lech Walesa. 
Dialogue began in the form of roundtable talks in Warsaw from February 6 to April 
4, 1989; on April 17 Solidarity was legalized. The talks resulted in Solidarity and the 
government agreeing to have one third of the parliamentary lower house allocated to the 
Communist Party and one third for Solidarity with the remaining open to voting. Following 
the voting, Solidarity took the majority and was able to designate a prime minister, the 
country’s first non-communist prime minister for more than 40 years. In December 1989 
the parliament voted for amendments to be made to the constitution to open the economy 
and rename the country as the Republic of Poland. In 1990 Lech Walesa succeeded in 
reaching the presidency of the state leading to the abolishment of the communist 
governmental system.  
In 1991 Marian Krzaklewski was elected to replace Walesa as the leader of 
Solidarity. Due to internal problems and the new vision of the Solidarity leadership, a 
collapse took place inside the movement and it decided to have its own political party to 
run for the parliamentary elections. In 1991 the first full free elections were held 
representing the entire Polish political spectrum, and showing a high fragmentation affected 
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by the problems that were taking place inside Solidarity. This resulted in no clear majority 
for any party. After the elections President Walesa named Jan Olszewski as prime minister 
but in 1992 he was replaced by Hanna Suchocka, a female prime minister. Elections were 
held in 1993 after the president dissolved the parliament. These elections demonstrated how 
much support for Solidarity had decreased, especially due to the government’s so-called 
“Balcerowicz plan”, named after the minister of finance, which had failed to increase the 
standard of living and caused varying social problems, such as higher unemployment and 
poverty, and also failed to ensure the transformation from a communist to a capitalist 
system ( Maragnos, 2003). In the first half of 1992 a form of constitution took shape. The 
document was inspired by a 1991 draft that had defined the relationship between powers 
and explained the division between the president and prime minister; this was considered a 
temporary solution before formulating a complete constitution.  
In 1997 parliamentary elections again took place, and the Solidarity movement was 
split into two parties, the Solidarity Electoral Action and the Freedom Union, which formed 
a coalition to make a government. In April 1997 the constitution was finalized as the first 
post-communist constitution and became effective from June 2000 (Wiatr, 1997).    
Representatives from all the independent unions that had represented all the participants in 
the strikes of July and August met in Gdansk, where they knew that over three million had 
joined a self-governing trade union called Solidarity. Lech Walesa, the elected chairman, 
traveled to Warsaw in order to register Solidarity. Solidarity was registered lately with 
some adjustments setting the role of it. This gave a general description of the difficult 
relations between the Communist Party and Solidarity from its inception. Authorities 
resisted all the attempts from the leaders of Solidarity to organize themselves and initiate 
new trade unions. The Solidarity policy was to carry out strikes in order to receive 
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concessions from the Communist Party while trying to stay away from politics, placing the 
entire focus on workers’ issues. Solidarity’s call was for a democratic society rather than 
democratic country, but this kind of policy was seen as an inevitable failure. Solidarity felt 
that there must be a new agreement as its non-political tactics were not working, and so 
began to call for political changes that would eventually lead to regime change (Timothy 
Garton Ash, 2002). Despite having the ability to mobilize millions of workers, Solidarity 
was not able to have a tangible influence on the decisions, both political and economic, 
targeting the workers. Polish society did not witness many changes on the political or 
economic levels after the Gdansk agreement: the regime was able to retain power without 
giving in to most of the workers’ demands. From its beginning, Solidarity’s attitude was 
vague and unclear. Neither its members nor outside observers were able to recognize 
Solidarity’s political strategy. Some felt that its goal was to oppose the communists and its 
rule directly, while others argued that Solidarity was simply aiming to empower the Gdansk 
agreement. However when Solidarity began to target political issues, the Communist Party 
soon saw Solidarity as a threat. When the government was unable to hold its promises, the 
Solidarity strikes started to increase and the idea took shape that this road would be the best 
to achieve changes in the country. At this point, violent acts increased against Solidarity 
leaders, especially after the Soviet Union gave the green light to polish leaders to solve the 
problem using any means. March 19, 1981 was a turning point for the confrontation 
between Solidarity and the Communist Party, when private farmers along with regional 
Solidarity leaders demonstrated and occupied the office of the party in Bydgoszcz, 
assuming that it would recognize the Rural Solidarity. When the negotiations between 
Solidarity and the party failed to make progress, police attacked the office, and threw the 
leaders from the building. At this point, relations between Solidarity and the party 
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descended into ever worsening hostility. More price increases and food shortages led to 
huge strikes that saw millions of people take the streets under Solidarity’s organization 
(Lawrence Goodwyn, 1991). 
 
3.3 The roundtable talks and the end of the communist regime 
A 40% increase in food prices in 1988 provided the spark that ultimately brought about the 
end of the communist regime in Poland. Due to this increase, huge strikes took place across 
the country. With these strikes, Solidarity was not the only organizer, as a young 
generation, featuring independent representatives of society also felt the need to address the 
Communist Party with their demands for change. At this point Poland was undergoing a 
pluralist transformation, and even Solidarity was fragmented, unable to attract young 
activists, yet still remaining the symbol of free society under the leadership of Lech Walesa 
(Devlin, Porter, & de Weydenthal, 1983). By the time that the massive strikes of August 
1988 took place, the communist regime knew that it faced a strong opposition that could 
not be ignored. Subsequently it began to consider negotiating to find a solution.  
At the end of August the roundtable talks began between all groups, without 
conditions. Twenty-nine representatives of the regime met with 26 representatives of the 
opposition, in the presence of three observers from the Catholic Church. These roundtable 
meetings were the culmination of many earlier informal meetings. Gale Stokes (1993) 
argues that “the symbolism of a roundtable was that it minimized the confrontational 
aspects of the negotiations and suggested the community of interests of all Poles”. The 
major subjects discussed were the pluralism of the state and legalization of Solidarity, with 
demands for political reforms, and the participation of Solidarity in the elections. Other 
  
47 
 
demands were related to areas such as media, healthcare, environment, and education 
(Viktor Osiatynski, 1996).  
Solidarity and the party were able to reach an agreement whereby they offered a 
new social contract: Solidarity would be legalized and have a minority representation in the 
parliament, thus the responsibility for implementing a new economic plan to attain growth 
would fall on all parties. In addition, Poland would witness partial free elections and a 
constitutional presidency. Two months after the official negotiations, Solidarity met again 
with the government, and accepted the agreement. Solidarity was subsequently legalized 
and set June 4, 1989, as the date for two-house parliamentary elections. The roundtable 
negotiations in Poland and strikes prior to them represented a breakthrough for Eastern 
Europe as a whole. Solidarity emerged victorious on June 4, 1989, winning 160 seats in the 
lower house and 99 out of 100 seats in the upper house (Gale Stokes, 1993). This election 
proved that the Communist Party lacked strong support from the people. Two months later, 
Solidarity was able to present a government, in a coalition with two communist parties. 
Lech Walesa was elected as president at the end of 1990 and the Communist Party was 
dissolved. The free parliamentary elections that followed in the New Year gave rise to 
democracy and saw the end of a totalitarian regime.  
Poland was the first country in Eastern Europe to witness free parliamentary 
elections that saw the engagement of activists in politics. These elections reflected the 
peaceful rejection of the dominance of the communist regime for more than fifty years. The 
roundtable discussions played the most important role for this whole process to be launched 
(Peter Cipkowski, 1991). 
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3.4 Geopolitical situation  
As previously mentioned the Polish revolution represented an ongoing conflict in the 
country that took place at high levels, especially since 1980, when conflicts took place 
between the Communist party supported by Moscow and the opposition groups. As a 
Catholic state Poland traditionally opposed Moscow and considered it as its enemy due to 
historical events. There are many causes that led to the uprisings in Poland including 
domestic but also external, geopolitical factors that played a vital role. Throughout the 
1980s the whole of Eastern Europe experienced dire economic situations that led to 
economic crises such as in Poland. These economic disasters led to massive demonstrations 
that prompted governments to apply more suppressive rules in order to put pressure on 
opposition groups. This inflexible strategy ultimately led to the downfall of communism. 
The initial refusal to negotiate, the instinct to suppress opposition groups, but then to ask 
for negotiations once they found themselves weakened, left the regimes vulnerable. This 
was compounded by the inability of communist regimes across the entire region to satisfy 
citizens and secure their basic needs as their economies stagnated. Meanwhile, the political 
tactics of Gorbachev, the president of the Soviet Union, tended to decrease support for 
states that were unlikely to survive without the USSR‘s backing.  
The Soviet leader, Mikail Gorbachev, was also reluctant to use force against opposition 
groups. According to the Eurasian expert Paul Goble, “had Gorbachev or any other Soviet 
leader tried to use force, it would have come to a bloody end rather than a relatively 
peaceful one, while one certainly is pleased that Moscow did not behave in the thuggish 
fashion it had often used before, I think we should recognize that Moscow did not use force 
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not out of some moral judgment but more likely out of a practical calculation that it simply 
did not have enough forces available to crack down everywhere” (year, p.?) 
3.4.1 The Church’s role and Pope John Paul the Second 
The vast majority of Poland’s population is Roman Catholic. The Catholic Church played a 
very important role on the social, political and cultural levels, whereby crowds of people 
used to attend Sunday church meetings and stay outside to listen to the priests’ speeches 
over loudspeakers. It was very different for the whole political track of the communism, 
before the election of Cardinal Karol Wojtyla as Pope John Paul the Second, and after him, 
especially for the role he played in mobilizing the masses and spreading the values of 
freedom among them. The Catholic Church in Poland suffered a lot of oppression at the 
hands of the communist regime under the leadership of Stalin. After his death, this 
repression decreased thanks to some reformers within the Communist Party, who placed 
conditions on the church that it must not interfere in politics and be loyal to the Communist 
Party. With the start of demonstrations and opposition against the Communist Party, the 
church found itself on the same track as the opposition groups, thus opposition members 
started to organize their meetings in church basements, and the church started to spread the 
values of freedom and democracy among the people. The relation between dissidence and 
the church was empowered further after Pope John Paul the Second delivered his speech in 
Poland in 1979.  
Adam Michnik, a non-Catholic Polish citizen, described his experience saying,  
“In June 1979, I lived through one of those moments in my life that gave me a sense 
that I was alive for a reason…I felt absolutely no sense of separation. Alongside me 
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kneeled a Catholic priest, and no one on that square had any intention to divide 
people. It was natural that we were together”.  
The origin of Solidarity was mainly initiated from the values presented by Pope John Paul 
the Second. The church tried its best not to be politicized, urging priests not to speak out 
loud and oppose the regime, but this cannot detract from the truth that most priests 
supported the opposition and were actively helping them. Following the assassination of 
Father Jerzy Popieluszko, who was killed by regime intelligence, the relation between the 
church and Solidarity grew stronger, moving toward cooperation on different levels. At this 
time, the church represented a symbol against communism, which saw activists not only 
attend church for praying, but also to express their opinions against communism.  
To conclude, the case of Poland demonstrates that regime change does not happen 
overnight or as a result of an immediate military coup or reactive movements, and it does 
not depend on one isolated, trivial factor. Rather, it involves a number of social, political 
and community factors and is fueled by the needs and frustrations of the mainstream 
community which eventually organizes itself, resorts to non-violent, civic methods of 
protest, gathering nationwide support in the process, especially from influential groups such 
as unions, political parties and religious figures. International support also played a role in 
strengthening the internal activism against the communist regime, eventually leading to 
diplomatic rounds of talks that ended its rule. In the next chapter, the case of Egypt will be 
the focus. The upcoming chapter will discuss the general environment and movements of 
the populist movements across the Arab world, starting from Tunisia’s initial 
developments, and then moving towards a discussion on the factors behind the revolution 
and the role of the civil society groups in Egypt’s case. 
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Chapter 4 
The Case of Egypt 
Beginning in December 2010, the wave of mass protests spread throughout several Arab 
countries, culminating in rulers being forced out of power, and at least two Arab countries 
undergoing significant changes within their systems in response to public protests. As far as 
this thesis is concerned, regime change in Egypt occurred twice, first forcing President 
Hosni Mubarak out of power, then sending the Muslim Brotherhood President Mohammad 
Morsi to prison, also as a result of public pressure. In this chapter, the background to 
Egypt’s regime is explored, demonstrating many strong similarities with the case of Poland, 
with the exception of the length of the time required to overthrow the Mubarak regime 
completely. This chapter shows that, similarly to Poland, both domestic and geopolitical 
factors combined to fuel the populist movements in Egypt over the years leading to the 
break-up of the regime. These movements were supported by international players and led 
by civil society organizations and youth groups that resorted to non-violent, street-based 
initiatives that put increasing pressure on the ruling class and its forces, leading to the quick 
break-up.  The role of civil society and youth groups will be discussed in detail in this 
chapter, with a discussion on their evolution over the years in Egyptian society, influence 
on the youth in Egypt, and the support which these movements received from foreign 
parties and organizations. 
4.1 Introduction 
The Arab Spring represented an unprecedented turn of events for the entire Middle East 
region, which had never witnessed such interconnected populist movements relating to 
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politics, security, and economics. What happened? What are the common issues shared by 
Middle Eastern countries? Were these movements a response to economic issues? Or did 
they stem from the lack of legitimacy and trust between the ruled and the ruling? Each 
country differs in its historical, political, economic, and social environment. Nevertheless, 
when the social uprisings in the Middle East occurred, many observers optimistically 
discussed the possibility of witnessing a new phenomenon in the region, whereby power 
could finally be placed in the hands of the people and used for the people. Sovereignty and 
self-determination were notions enacted to become reality through street protests that 
spread gradually from Tunisia on December 18, 2010, to Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, and 
Yemen. The Middle East region has traditionally been receptive towards various 
ideologies, including Pan Arabism, nationalism, Islamism, and others. 
The popular uprisings that started on December 18, 2010, in Tunisia inspired many 
Middle Eastern countries to experience a similar outbreak of popular waves calling for 
freedom. Once dictators had been overthrown, the international community realized that 
Arab awareness of holding officials accountable and responsible for their actions was 
actually possible in Arab politics. A lot has been written in an attempt to explain the 
persistence of authoritarianism in Arab societies, however yet no one predicted the 
occurrence of the Arab Spring revolts.  Security, geopolitical, political, and economic 
issues, gender inequality, and Islamic culture are all factors cited by Middle East experts as 
impediments for demanding and practicing freedom and democracy. The unpredictable 
uprising in Egypt that was led by educated youth demanding a more liberal, civil, and 
democratic type of governance in the place of Mubarak’s regime will be the focus of this 
chapter. Who were the main revolutionary actors from among the social movements and 
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civil society? What are the main domestic and geopolitical factors that played an important 
role in the revolution? These questions will be explored in this chapter.  
A look at Egyptian political history up to the present day will enable us to ascertain 
the main reasons behind the 2011 popular uprising and the factors that led to the January 25 
revolution.  A lot has been written in an attempt to explain why the Middle East never 
before witnessed this bid for change and call for democracy. Explanations on the 
exceptionality of the Middle East range from issues of culture/Islam to economic and 
security reasons. According to Kamrava (2002), Middle Eastern countries, as with all 
developing nations, face the problem of semi-formality where there is little will or ability to 
act towards solving this issue. Moreover, Kamrava explains the relation between the state 
and the informal sector as a mutually beneficial one. The state benefits from the informal 
sector and does not act to regulate it. This case leads us to the famous causal formula, no 
taxation equals any representation.  
Other scholarly works, such as that of Luciani (2009), argue that oil has had a huge 
impact in the Middle East whereby the rentier system was created. In the rentier system, the 
state is independent of society and thus does not seek legitimacy through representation; 
meanwhile, society is satisfied with its share of the distribution of economic benefits from 
renting oil. According to Luciani (2009), the impact of oil is not only on the domestic 
politics of the state; rather it exhibits an impact on the relation among countries in the 
Middle East as well as among the Middle Eastern countries with the major international 
actors. An important reason for the exceptionality of the Middle East is given by Eva Belin 
(2004). She blames it not on socio-economic or cultural factors, but rather on the robustness 
of state institutions in strengthening the coerciveness of the state in repressing any 
democratic initiatives.  Nevertheless, it is interesting that Belin links the strength of the 
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coercive institutions to four important characteristics such as international support, the 
rentier system, the limited degree of mobilization, and the patrimonial characteristic of the 
state. On the other hand, none of the scholarly works, whether cited in this paper or not, has 
succeeded in offering an insightful explanation of the exceptionality of the Middle East 
given the fact that the Arab Spring shattered all barriers of fear built up by authoritarian 
regimes. For the first time in the history of the Middle East, there has been a mass 
movement that led to the ousting of a ruler 
 
4.2 Immediate Causes Leading to Regime Breakdown: 
The immediate causes leading to the regime breakdown in Egypt began with the impact of 
the Tunisian revolution’s outcome. Days after the regime fell in Tunisia, people took to the 
streets in Egypt inspired by the outcome of the Tunisian demonstrators who were able to 
topple down Bin Ali’s regime. Yet, Egyptians are not unfamiliar to demonstrations: in the 
previous year’s Egyptian workers often demonstrated in the industrial city in Cairo in 
demand for better working conditions and wages, and were eventually supported by youth 
groups, leading to several arrests and an increasing pressure on the regime’s economic 
policies (Andersen, 2011). 
 
4.2.1 The Mahalla uprisings in 2008  
Back in 2006, the industrial city North of Cairo, known as Mahalla, was the epicenter for 
frequent labor unrest. The protests grew in 2008, leading to demonstrations that included 
youth groups that wanted to express their discontentment with the regime’s economic 
policies. No demonstrations of such size and scale were witnessed in Egypt ever since 1952 
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(Gopal, 2011). The main demands were both job insecurity and wages, as more sections of 
the economy were getting privatized. As Andersen (2011) describes: “For the first time in 
Egypt, the picture of the president was publicly stepped on, and the crowds shouted “down 
with Mubarak” (p.17). Although arrests were made on a mass scale, the events sparked 
new, more organized movements which were critical to the events of the 2011 uprising. 
 
4.2.2 April 6th movement  
The April 6th youth movement was a consequence of the Mahalla uprisings in Cairo. It all 
started as a Facebook group with up to 70,000 members back in 2009, gradually growing to 
become more than just a group, but rather an important logistical role for the 2011 uprisings 
(Andersen, 2011), which highlights the catalyst role of social media platforms in the 
uprisings. 
 
4.2.3 The day of rage 
Although demonstrations in the areas of Cairo grew in size and number, the first 
significantly large demonstration took place on the day of January 25, 2011, and at that 
time it coincided with the national holiday to recognize police forces (Flanegan, 2011). 
Also, although many other demonstrations took place in other Egyptian cities, the biggest 
one by far was the one in Tahrir Square in central Cairo. Here, social networks had a 
critical role: they provided constant updated information on what is happening in closed 
areas, in addition to the daily clashes with police (Flanegan, 2011). The government was 
well aware of the influence of social media platforms, and learning from the experience in 
Tunisia, it closed down social networking sites on January 27
th
, then blaming the events of 
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the uprisings on the Muslim brotherhood group, leading to multiple arrests of its members. 
Then, text and mobile services were closed down on the 28
th
, making it extremely 
challenging for the protestors to communicate among each other (Flanegan, 2011). Also, Al 
Jazeera network, which was immensely popular, got its offices closed in Cairo and was cut 
off air. Moreover, Mubarak-supporting individuals were sent to the demonstrations in 
Tahrir square to cause chaos and hurt the protestors, leading protestors there to set up their 
own security checkpoints to prevent such troublesome people from embedding themselves 
into their demonstrations (Flanegan, 2011). Two weeks of continuous protests eventually 
led to the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak announcing his resignation from his position, 
and a military council took charge of the country. 
 
4.2.4 Role of the Army 
 
In Egypt, the role of the army was critical in shaping the events that led to the uprooting of 
the Moubarak regime. According to Ghannoushi (2011) “had the Egyptian army not pulled 
the rug from under Mubarak's feet, siding with protesters in Tahrir Square, the story of its 
revolution may have more closely resembled the uprisings of Syria, Yemen, and perhaps 
even Libya” (p.1). The events most likely would have been described as a bitter and bloody 
confrontation that would have cost thousands of lives and definitely prolonged the conflict 
that would have delayed the fall of Moubarak (Ghannoushi, 2011). Yet, what the Egyptian 
army truly did is that it supported the people with their demands and stood by them as a 
catalyst for change and a source of security and protection for the protestors camping at Al 
Tahrir square, leading to the popular chant among the masses “The people and the army are 
one hand”, as the army was perceived as a partner in the people’s revolution in Egypt, in 
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addition to being the guardian and representative of the revolution’s legitimacy 
(Ghannoushi, 2011). 
4.3  General Factors behind the revolution 
Egypt’s transition from a monarchic kingdom to a republic began when General 
Muhammad Najib assumed power in 1953. In 1981, Hosni Mubarak assumed power and 
remains, to date, the longest serving ruler of Egypt since Muhammad Ali’s rule under the 
Ottoman Empire. The 30-year rule of Mubarak was brought to an end after large-scale 
protest demonstrations took place for around 18 days in Cairo’s Tahrir Square in January 
2011. The social upheaval that occurred in Egypt gave birth to “grass-roots movements that 
could not be contained, negotiated with, or controlled through a few leaders”, resulting in 
the toppling of Mubarak’s regime (Murphy 2011) and giving rise to the phrase ‘January 
revolution’. Forced to resign despite making promises of reform, Mubarak left the 
presidential palace on February 11, 2011.  
There are a number of points worth noting concerning the uprisings in the Middle 
East. Generally, the process of uprising was leaderless and composed of different factions 
of society, such as civilians, military personnel, political, non-political, religious, and non-
religious parties. Nevertheless, once the primary objective of the uprising, namely ousting 
the dictator, had been accomplished, the focus shifted towards internal clashes, driven 
along sectarian, ethnic, ideological, and military divisions in society. Since the outbreak of 
Egypt’s popular uprising, many scholars have tried to understand this unique Middle 
Eastern phenomenon. What are the main reasons that led to the wide-scale popular 
uprisings in Egypt? And most importantly, how were the demonstrations that toppled 
Mubarak’s regime carried out for the period of 18 consecutive days? This chapter will note 
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the factors that pushed the prominent social movement and civil society actors to start the 
revolution. 
4.3.1 Domestic factors  
The main reasons that led to the outbreak of social movements in Egypt are various. The 
protests began in exasperation against poverty, unemployment, corruption, and repression 
and were thus considered to be protests against Mubarak’s regime. Nevertheless, Amin 
(2003) believes that one of the pivotal reasons behind the massive uprising in Egypt could 
be attributed to societal development. In terms of societal development, it is important to 
note that the culture, including elements such as journalism, television, and fashion, has 
changed in Egypt over the past 50 years due to the growth of the population and the effects 
of globalization. Nevertheless, development is a movement towards establishing democracy 
since, as Munck (2002) argues, the higher the development in a society, the higher the 
levels of democracy, which in turn leads to the establishment of a higher global democracy.  
It is important to note that students, workers, and professors were the main 
protagonists in the spontaneous movements that occurred in Egypt and there was no distinct 
leadership. Even the opposition parties in Egypt, like the Muslim Brotherhood, were trying 
to integrate themselves as part of these movements but not as their leaders. “Mubarak must 
go now” proved to be a major slogan in Tahrir Square, with no alternative leader or 
ideology emerging from the crowds of the protesters. As a result, the spontaneous and 
leaderless social movement in Egypt was divided on whether it would be sufficient to 
topple Mubarak and to trust the promises of reform, or to rebuild Egypt anew by bringing a 
regime change. Another popular slogan that accompanied all of the cries for freedom in the 
Middle East was “the people want the regime to fall”.. Based on interviews conducted with 
Egyptian youth activists in fall 2011, there was a consensus among the 12 interviewees on 
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the reasons that led people to overcome their fears and demonstrate against Mubarak’s 
regime. The brutal regime acts and corruption accumulated against Egyptian society over 
time proved to be the regime’s undoing.  
Arab countries unanimously lack sufficient data on the exact number of civil society 
organizations that are active on the ground. Regarding Egypt, the number of civil society 
organizations varies from one reference to another. Khalaf (2010) estimates the number to 
be over 21,000, while the Arab Network for NGOs estimates them at around 31,000. 
According to Khalaf (2010), the history of social movements begins in 1821 with the 
Hellenic Philanthropic Association in Alexandria. Even if there is not an accurate number 
for the number of civil society actors operating in Egypt, there is clear agreement that civil 
society actors played the main role in organizing Egyptian youth to push them to 
demonstrate on the streets against Mubarak’s regime. The most important civil society 
actors are the Kefaya movement, April 6 movement and We Are All Khaled Said 
movement. The Kefaya movement was among the first to be launched as an opposition 
movement against Mubarak’s regime. It roots date back to fall 2004, and focused on 
dissatisfaction with the Egyptian regime’s grip on political power. The 2005 presidential 
elections in Egypt, at which point the idea of inheritance of presidential power from Hosni 
Mubarak to his son Gamal was introduced, provided a major impetus to the movement. 
Eventually Kefaya evolved into a movement that sought to tackle all of the corruption 
issues in the Egyptian government.  
The April 6 youth movement was the first to originate as a Facebook group, with its 
goal being to mobilize civilians for a nationwide protest in support of the workers of El-
Mahalla El-Kobba in 2008. After this event the April 6 movement enlarged its scope to 
fight for human and civil rights for Egyptians, calling for freedom of speech, an end to 
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corruption, and many other social demands. The formation of the We Are All Khaled Said 
movement proved to be a turning point for Egypt’s civil society. The movement stems from 
when 27 year-old Khaled Said was beaten to death, allegedly by security forces, in 
Alexandria in June 2010. The group reflects Egyptian solidarity over Khaled’s fate, 
whereby Khaled is seen as a symbolic son of any Egyptian family, thus inspiring the need 
to revolt against the status quo in Egypt.  
Any discussion of Egyptian opposition cannot take place without directly referring 
to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood has a long history, dating back to the 
early 1900s, with its origins rooted in opposition and including episodes of violence. It 
came to be seen as the de facto opposition of the political status quo, but was unable to 
reach any position of legitimate power until the 2012 presidential elections when its 
candidate Mohammad Morsi was elected president. In the revolution that ousted President 
Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood reinforced its centrist position by encouraging young 
people to organize mass protests, and calling for all groups to unite against Mubarak’s 
regime. The historical background of the Muslim Brotherhood shows the extent to which 
the group has evolved over time. The Muslim Brotherhood is aware that it was not the 
instigator of, nor the main actor in, the January uprisings, yet it was the most organized 
group and recognized the valuable role of youth in enforcing the balance of power and 
organizing the protests. With its new generation of young leaders, the Muslim Brotherhood 
reached a point where it recognized the need to cooperate with other opposition groups. 
The silent majority in Egypt (which consists mainly of movements drawn from middle-
class citizens as students, activists and professionals) was not as institutionalized as the 
Muslim Brotherhood, thus enabling the Muslim Brotherhood to attain political power more 
easily.  
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When considering the Muslim Brotherhood’s actions during the January revolution 
from a historical perspective, it becomes clear that its careful approach to the protests 
formed an extension of the group’s strategy of the past decades. This strategy exhibits a 
preference for incremental rather than revolutionary change; it is cautious and pragmatic, 
built on close cooperation with other Egyptian political actors. The role played by the 
Muslim Brotherhood in demonstrations was limited, and included an official abstention 
from participation in the so-called day of rage, based on the possibility of it constituting a 
failed revolution. However, on Friday January 28, the Muslim Brotherhood did participate, 
albeit remaining in the background. In the words of one of its leaders: “We are not pushing 
this movement, but we are moving with it. We don’t wish to lead it but we want to be part 
of it”. As the revolution continued to spread, especially outside Egypt, the Muslim 
Brotherhood went out of its way to make assurances that its aim was not to dominate 
Egypt’s post-Mubarak political scene.  
When viewed from the historical context of the Muslim Brotherhood, this assurance 
reflects a persistent fear of being part of a failed revolution which could result in its leaders 
being imprisoned. Likewise, the Muslim Brotherhood was equally afraid to be the leaders 
of a successful revolution that could be perceived as a continuation of its historical 
eagerness to take power. Moreover, later political gains made by religious movements 
indicate the well-organized structure of these movements’ preparations and mass 
legitimacy. These Islamic movements championed the revival of Islamic rule but with 
moderation. This attitude led the American Administration to accept and consider the 
political reality in a similar fashion to Turkish ‘moderated Islamic’ rule. 
With the major question facing Egypt today of how the country would emerge after 
Mubarak, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces headed by Defense Minister Muhammad 
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Hussein Tantawi assumed control of power after the resignation of President Hosni 
Mubarak. While Mubarak was facing trial and after the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces dissolved the Egyptian parliament, early elections for the National Assembly 
representatives were held in November 2011. Egypt has a bicameral legislature with two 
chambers, the lower chamber known as the People’s Assembly, and the upper chamber 
known as Majlis Al Shura. Egyptians demonstrated their eagerness to express their right to 
choose their leaders, and for power to be by the people and for the people.  
Nevertheless, there remain a couple of important questions to be addressed 
concerning the unpredicted social upheaval that occurred in Egypt on January 25th 2011, 
especially after examining the results of the parliamentary elections. The Muslim 
Brotherhood controlled both houses of parliament where the elected speakers of the 
People’s Assembly and Majlis Al Shura are members of the party. The Muslim 
Brotherhood dominated with 58 percent of the Majlis Al Shura and 47 percent (refer to 
Table 1.1) of the People’s Assembly. 
Table 1: Election Results in People’s Assembly 
Party Seats Percentage (%) 
Freedom and Justice  235 47 
Nour 121 24 
New Wafd 38 7.6 
Egyptian Bloc 34 6.8 
Al Wasat Party 10 2 
Reform and 
Development 
9 1.8 
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Revolution Continues 
Bloc 
7 1.4 
Other parties 18 3.6 
Independents 26 5.2 
Appointed by Military 
Council 
10 2 
 
Figure 1: Counting the ballots at an open- air election center 
There are three competing groups in Egypt today in the post-uprising, the Salafists, Muslim 
Brotherhood, and the army. Despite the fact that the protestors against Mubarak’s regime 
were mainly liberals and leftists, the voting results (refer to Figure 1.1) for the People’s 
Assembly were dominated by the supporters of the Noor Party (Salafists) and the Muslim 
Brotherhood, with the latter holding the highest percentage . During Mubarak’s rule, and 
since 1990, the parliamentary elections shad always resulted in an unprecedented majority 
for the ruling party, the National Democratic Party.  
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However, with the ousting of Mubarak and the dissolution of his party, a new 
political party law was initiated on March 28, 2011. The new law requires each new party 
to have at least 5,000 members from at least ten of Egypt’s provinces. Although many 
believed that this new law would ease the restrictions on civil and political rights that had 
been limited under Mubarak, this new law could also be an impediment to the emergence of 
new political parties in the political arena due to the eligibility criteria. Moreover, with the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s recent dominance, the party has been endorsing civil democratic 
principles along with the endorsement of Al Azhar documents. Yet, the question persists as 
to what extent can we say that Egypt is moving towards a post-Islamist rule?  Bayat (2011) 
argues that the post-Islamism is a movement that paves the way for democratic change in a 
manner that gives Islam a significant role to play. 
 
Figure 2: Voting percentages Islamic vs. Secular 
Despite the fact that almost half of the Egyptian interviewees called for a separation 
between religion and politics, there was a consensus among them concerning their 
preference for a future state based on a mixture of Sharia law and civil laws. Yet another 
contradiction is shown in the responses of the interviewees concerning their attitude 
towards foreign powers, such as the United States and Israel, with some indicating hostility 
0%
50%
100%
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
70 76 67 
27 20 30 
Islamic Secular
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and others hospitability. Some interviewees predicted a worsening of relations with such 
powers while others believed that the relations would remain the same. Even though 
Egypt's Peace Treaty with Israel and alliance with Washington may upset some of the 
Egyptian public, the focus during the Tahrir Square revolution remained on domestic issues 
such as Egypt's corrupted government, unemployment problem, poor educational system, 
and lack of government services. The uprising’s goal was internal reforms toward a 
democratic regime. However, after the resignation of Mubarak there were positive signs 
and efforts taking place between Tehran and Cairo, reflecting a strong will to cooperate. 
Furthermore, hostility expressed against the Israeli Embassy in September revealed a desire 
by some to break ties with Israel, which gave rise to concern in the corridors of power in 
Tel Aviv and Washington. Nevertheless, the events that occurred in this year present 
another form of Arab permeability, permeability against oppression. This permeability is 
creating a new Arab identity, and a new face of pan-Arabism. Salem (2011) argues that 
today there are three worlds: the Arab, Turkish, and Iranian. The idea of a single Arab 
united world emerging once again is quite interesting. Many international and regional 
players will start reconsidering their agendas in the Middle East, especially Israel. But the 
question remains, will there be a single Arab united world?  
With the presidential elections set to launch in late May (taking place on May 23 
and 24 and June 16 and17), the situation in Egypt is still unstable especially after Salafi 
protests against the exclusion of their candidate Hazim Abo Ismail from the presidential list 
based on his mother’s foreign nationality were met with brutal military force in the 
A’basiyeh area. Nevertheless, among the presidential candidates that were running for 
elections, none of them exhibits charismatic leadership qualities that could galvanize the 
support of all Egyptian factions. The presidential chair remains a struggle of power between 
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the Salafi, Muslim Brotherhood, and other candidates ranging from independents to Amr 
Moussa to the Nasser’s Party represented by Hamdeen Sabahi. 
Nevertheless, the social movements that the Middle East witnessed were powerful 
ingredients against autocratic regimes. The network power was a weapon that could not be 
constrained once it was launched. The undemocratic regimes in the Middle East were not 
prepared for such scenarios. Al Jazeera, Al Arabiyeh, BBC, France 24, Al Hiwar, and other 
media channels were vicious tools allowing people from the entire world to stay updated 
concerning the movements in the region. When Mubarak’s regime blocked all Internet 
connections for around five days, the Al Jazeera channel collected information from 
Internet pages, such as those of Facebook and Twitter, and sent them as updates and news 
on mobile phones. Thus, it can be seen that Internet and communication innovations had a 
major impact on the social movements that occurred in the Middle East. People from all 
around the region could watch what was happening through ‘Tweeting’, ‘Facebooking’, 
and ‘Skyping’ the latest updates and videos. However, these technological innovations 
were only a stepping stone towards the achievement of toppling Mubarak’s regime. Even 
with the absence of social media, the uprisings would have been possible.   
According to Chick and Murphy (2011), “though many factors contributed to the 
social revolution that swept Mubarak away – the spread of communication technologies 
like the Internet, a youth bulge that had never known any ruler but him, the stunning 
evidence from Tunisia that a popular uprising could succeed – his economic failures were a 
crucial component.” Moreover, the uprisings in Egypt illustrated ideological cohesiveness 
among the various ethnic identities for the call for freedom and dignity. Salami & Pearson 
(2011) believe that in order to explain how and why the uprisings happened, one must 
observe the perspective of historical grievances, advancement in technology, and economic 
  
67 
 
globalization. These three factors were crucial in undermining the authoritarianism of 
Mubarak.  
Philip Howard is one of the most prominent scholars who argues that the Egyptian 
revolution is an excellent example of the modern use of technology. Via social media, 
Egyptian citizens were able express their beliefs and points of view in a space beyond the 
control of the regime. Through social media youth were able to transfer and share ideas and 
day-by-day events easily, outside the regime atmosphere. It is widely accepted that the 
stimulus for the Egyptian revolution came from social media, where the educated youth 
demographic started posting videos and writing statuses that called for demonstrating 
against the regime. The Facebook page We Are All Khaled Said attracted more than 
400,000 followers and represented one of the most important movements that led the 
Egyptian revolution (Dewey, Kaden & Zhu 2012). The Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia gave 
the Egyptians hope for a change after a long period of dictatorship and authoritarianism. 
According to a study conducted by Howard, Duffy, Freelon, Hussain, Mari, & Maziad 
(2011), at least 10% of Egyptians use the Internet on a daily basis and 70% of the 
population are under the age of 34 and very knowledgeable with regard to Internet use. 
Social media represented the link between the social activists and the people on the ground 
outside of the government’s control, and managed to forge a direct connection between the 
online bloggers online from inside and outside Egypt and across the world, thus 
encouraging more peaceful demonstrations.  
As is the case with all Arab states, Egypt has witnessed a widening gap between the 
lower and the upper classes, with a gradually diminishing middle class to almost the point 
of extinction. The bad economic situation fueled anger among Egyptian citizens toward the 
regime’s economic policies, and meant that the relevant governments were perceived as the 
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cause of the dire economic misery. Corn (2011) argues that the World Bank and other 
Egyptian officials stated that there had been positive economic growth, but that this was 
only reflected in certain sectors such as tourism, and this bad growth model increased the 
economic disparity instead of improving living standards. According to Corn (2011), 80% 
represent the lower class that holds secondary degree, where by other people which used to 
benefit from the Egyptian got into conflicts with the protesters.  
 The Egyptian army represented the trigger that ended Mubarak’s rule after 20 
years. The military refused to open fire against the protesters or to repress the 
demonstrations, thus weakening the regime. According to Makara (2012), Mubarak used 
two tactics to sustain his regime. The first was to build parallel security organizations and 
allocate incentives to military leaders to play a role in preserving the regime. The security 
institutions used to defend Mubarak’s rule, by enhancing the rule of his party, and to 
monitor one another, limiting the chances of a coup against the regime. On the other hand, 
for these security institutions to be established and work extensively, economic and 
political benefits were given to the security leaders, such as generous salaries, housing, 
health care and the monopolization of certain profitable economic sectors (Makara, 2012). 
This strategy of creating a security power to maintain the regime ultimately proved to be a 
failure, neatly illustrated by the army’s decision to stand with the demonstrators against the 
regime. Moreover the army’s position protected it from any internal split, as it represented 
the majority of the Egyptians that were on the ground calling for the toppling of the regime. 
In addition, the position taken by the military gave it a top position between the masses 
where they will not be threatened in the future by other opposition groups.  
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4.4  Geopolitical factors     
When first considering the geopolitical factors that had a direct effect on the continuation of 
the Egyptian revolution, and the will of millions of Egyptians to finally take to the streets to 
demand the toppling of the regime, the self-immolation of Mohamad Buazizi on December 
17 2010 takes precedence. The Tunisian citizen from the city of Sidi Bouzid became a 
symbol for the start of the uprisings and represented a turning point for the entire Arab 
public opinion, including the Egyptian masses who went to the streets calling for an end to 
Mubarak’s regime. Spontaneous popular demonstrations saw the participation of every 
strata of society, irrespective of gender, age, or class, congregating in Tahrir Square for one 
cause, for a demand for freedom and democracy. 
 Widespread socio-economic issues form yet another of the major geopolitical 
factors in the entire region, whose roots lie in the ruling regimes’ abuses of financial 
privileges (Dalacoura, 2011). The Arab regimes used to paint a picture of a healthy 
economy witnessing growth, although this distorted the reality of poverty and high 
unemployment among the educated youth. This situation encouraged Arab public opinion 
to turn against the ruling regimes, especially when compounded by the high levels of 
inequality, corruption, the global 2008 financial crisis, and food price increases.  
 While examining the contagious spread of social uprisings in the Arab world, and in 
order to assess the case of Egypt, it is necessary to regard Huntington’s theories on the third 
wave of democratization and the clash of civilization. Assessing the components of these 
theories in relation to the events occurring in Egypt will enable us to determine whether 
Egypt is in the phase of a wave or a clash. After examining the first two waves in history 
along with the reverse waves that followed respectively, Huntington (2003) categorized the 
transition to democracy in the world as taking place in three waves. According to 
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Huntington (2003), the world is in the phase of a third democratic wave. The current era, 
since the year 1974, is in the phase of a “modern global democratic revolution.” However, 
Huntington does not neglect the fact that a third reverse wave might occur. In case a reverse 
wave occurs, then the world would await a fourth democratic wave; however, this wave 
would require two pre-requisites: political leadership and economic development. 
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning and examining Huntington’s five important factors 
that contributed to the emergence of the third democratic wave: 
•Legitimacy problems facing authoritarian regimes 
•The global economic growth that the world witnessed in the 1960s 
•The withdrawal of the role of religion, the role of the Catholic Church  
•The change of the international actors’ policies 
•A snowball effect 
Nevertheless, Huntington (1993) stated that world politics are in a latest phase, in which 
conflicts are not fought based on ideological or economic differences, but rather on cultural 
differences.  Despite the fact that nation states will remain the most powerful players, the 
principle conflict will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. 
Assessing the case of Egypt in relation to Huntington’s theories, we find that Mubarak’s 
regime faced exasperated protestors for 18 consecutive days. Many Egyptians believe that 
after the ousting of Mubarak’s regime, their country is on the right track and headed in a 
better direction (refer to Table 1.2). Mubarak’s regime faced a legitimacy problem whereby 
corruption, repression, and coercion were methods used to instill barriers of fear in society. 
Poverty is striking in Egypt and unemployment was and is on the rise. The Egyptian youth, 
in a survey conducted in 2010 by the Population Council, place poverty, corruption, and 
  
71 
 
education as the top social issues that need to be addressed urgently. (Refer to Table 1.3 
and Table 1.4). 
 
 
Figure 3: Egyptian opinions concerning whether Egypt is heading in the right or wrong direction 
 
Table 2: Important social issues in the eyes of youth 
Social Issues Reported as ‘Very 
Important’ 
Percent (Aged 
15-29) 
Poverty reduction 92 
Fighting rising prices 90 
Fighting corruption 88 
Reforming the education system 86 
Strong defense forces 86 
Reforming the health care system 85 
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A high level of economic growth 78 
Protecting freedom of speech 75 
Protection of political rights 64 
People have a larger role in government 63 
Political leaders with stronger religious 
beliefs 
53 
 
 
Figure 4: How Egyptians perceive the economic situation (April 2011) 
When the spokesman of Al Azhar, the world’s oldest Islamic university, Mohamed Refaa 
al-Tahtawy, resigned in February 2011 in order to join the anti-Mubarak protests, these 
protests appeared to also receive religious support. With regard to the army, during the 18 
days of protests, it remained neutral thus giving itself the role of protecting civilians and 
ensuring stability. Egypt was the first country to follow suit in the wake of the Tunisian 
uprising. Despite the historical grievances that had accumulated against Mubarak’s regime, 
the Egyptians were inspired by the Tunisian uprising, which led to President Ben Ali’s 
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exile. They were encouraged to break the barrier of fear, to repeat the 2004 and 2008 
demonstrations, but this time with a fully-fledged demonstration in Tahrir Square in which 
all Egyptians joined. In terms of international support, it is worth looking at the reactions of 
the USA, UK, and France. 
 The United States of America and other international actors such as France and the 
United Kingdom expressed their change in policy towards Mubarak through demanding 
that he step down, listen to the demands of citizens, and allow for the realization of a civil 
and democratic type of governance. 
 On the other hand, we cannot ignore the fact that the differences among civilizations 
are real. Civilizations are differentiated throughout history by factors such as tradition, 
culture, and religion. Cultural characteristics and differences are less easy to resolve than 
political and economic differences. Nevertheless, people are becoming separated from their 
local identities in order to attach themselves to social characteristics that unite them with 
others in the world and thus weakening the concept of the nation state. This occurs due to 
economic modernization and globalization. Taking into consideration the case of Egypt, we 
see that throughout the uprisings against Mubarak, society was able to avoid division 
between Muslim and Copts. Throughout the 18 days of protest in Tahrir Square, media 
coverage transmitted images of Muslims praying on Friday while being protected by a 
human chain of Copts. However, after the election results brought the Muslim Brotherhood 
to power, many Copts remained skeptical with regards to future policies. The first 
difference arose over the issue of amending the constitution. The Muslim Brotherhood 
called for amending a couple of articles in the constitution while the Copts called for an 
entirely newly formed constitution. Looking at the factors that constitute a wave versus 
those that constitute a clash, we can see that Egypt fulfills the factors of a democratic wave; 
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however, the issue of Muslims versus Copts remains on hold for now until a further 
analysis of events can be made, especially after the Presidential elections take place, and 
also in relation to the position of regional countries. 
4.5 The role of civil society organizations and youth groups in Egypt’s 
regime breakdown 
When discussing the role of non-governmental organizations and civil society groups, it is 
important to first define them and their function. According to Abdel Samad (2011), civil 
society organizations (CSOs) are institutionalized and organized non-governmental groups 
which work for common public interests. That being said, their role in the early years even 
before the regime breakdown in Egypt is undeniable.  
First of all, it should be noted that practitioners and analysts alike have often 
referred to the civil society organizations’ role in the Arab world as having been sidelined 
before 2011. Even when the uprisings took place, many believed that the ability of CSOs to 
organize and mobilize was insignificant to the overall magnitude and impact of the 
uprisings and the final outcomes that were achieved. However, a broader understanding of 
the reality of the events during and before the uprisings presents another conclusion. First 
of all, it is true that civil society organizations may not have acted as perfectly and ideally 
as they should, but the reason for that is not their lack of competence or will, but rather the 
fact that they had been facing multiple challenges ranging from lack of sufficient funding to 
political pressure and frequent crackdowns by regime intelligence groups which crippled 
their ability to operate as their constituency’s legitimate representatives. According to 
Goldstone (2011), the main importance of the role of CSOs in the uprising was first in the 
popular mobilization of citizens and the organization of mass protests with a common 
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objective of seeking fundamental regime change. According to Ziad Abdel Samad (2011), 
the role of the CSOs in the regime change in Egypt did not begin in 2011: “The 
achievements were an accumulation of the efforts and struggles of various societal factions 
and civil society groups” (p. 3). Nevertheless, there are other views that consider that there 
are individual young leaders who actually drove the momentum towards change. According 
to Goldstone (2011), “CSOs cannot take the credit for the achieved successes of the 
revolution in Egypt. Young Egyptians were the driving engine; political parties and 
organizations rode the current – quite late” (p.2). Yet despite this opposing view, it cannot 
be denied that the CSOs assisted in boosting the magnitude of the citizen outreach and the 
protests throughout the country (Goldstone, 2011). 
What the literature also pays attention to is the level to which human rights 
organizations specifically have contributed to building a generation that is well-educated 
when it comes to human rights at all levels. This is especially true for women’s 
organizations which placed gender equality as their top priority through mainstream efforts 
which continuously pressured the Egyptian regime to ratify international conventions and 
treaties regarding women’s rights such as ICCPR, CEDAW and ICSECR (Goldstone, 
2011). In addition, Abdel Samad (2011) explains that civil society organizations have 
lobbied for achieving better access to and quality education, leading to an increase in 
school enrollments in certain regions where they have been active the most during the past 
20 years. In addition to this, organizations which promote international democracy have 
intensified their efforts in recent years to promote and expand the role of CSOs in political 
life, policy-development and decision-making. There have been many initiatives led by 
local CSOs in Egypt which introduced democratic concepts such as local elections 
observation, civic advocacy and parliamentary monitoring over the years (Abdel Samad, 
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2011). This eventually increased the awareness and know-how of activists in holding 
governments accountable and lobbying to amend policies through popular movements. As a 
result, this also gave rise to independent groups of young, well-educated Arabs which took 
action to express their demands, despite being marginalized by the state’s regime for many 
years. The momentum and the level of awareness and advocacy which was created by the 
CSO groups over the years helped to encourage independent self-help groups. According to 
Samir Amin, there were three main components which gave rise to the revolution in Egypt. 
The first is a re-politicized youth, who expressed and prepared themselves according to 
their own will, benefiting from and encouraged and inspired by the efforts of CSOs over the 
years (Halaseh, 2011). Secondly, there was a radical left, which was considered part of the 
opposition groups, and finally, a democratic middle class, which includes those who 
support the democratic objective without specifically objecting to the resource allocation, 
market forces or the foreign alignment (Goldstone, 2011). 
This chapter has provided a thorough discussion of the case of Egypt which 
demonstrated the importance of time, internal and external environmental factors in fueling 
and shaping the regime change in that country.  The role of CSOs was of particular 
importance and received ample discussion in this chapter, which emphasized their role as 
catalysts and organizers of popular protests, in addition to being primary advocates of 
human rights. However, the chapter also shed light on the challenges facing the upcoming 
ruling governments in Egypt: poverty, rising prices, poor education levels and corruption 
within the system are all top priorities in the process of re-building a democratic Egyptian 
regime.   
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Chapter Five 
                              Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the findings of this thesis highlighted the critical role of youth groups and 
civil society organizations in the breakdown of regimes, with a specific focus on Egypt and 
Poland. These findings shed light on the answers to the research questions: How did civil 
society and non-governmental groups in Egypt and Poland contribute to regime 
breakdown? What specific roles did they have with regard to the regime breakdown? Such 
questions are important to answer, in order to explain how the power for change is actually 
rooted in the people and society. The answers also help in affirming whether the work, 
structure and resources of CSOs do actually pay off when the opportunity of regime change 
arises. After all, many years of hard work and millions of dollars were spent on funding 
these CSOs, with the overall purpose of empowering social and political change. Did they 
succeed when they were put to test?  If so, how?  If not, why not? Also, when and why did 
Poland and Egypt experience regime breakdown? These are important questions to answer 
in order to evaluate a society’s potential to create sustainable change where it matters the 
most. 
To answer these questions, the thesis first investigated how geopolitical and 
domestic factors impacted the regime breakdowns in both countries over the years. The 
thesis attempted to answer these questions by examining first the case of Poland and Egypt, 
with a brief historical overview of the socio-political reality of both countries prior to their 
regime breakdowns. To provide relevant background information which was also used to 
answer the research questions, the thesis reviewed some of the major themes and literature 
reviews on the domestic and geopolitical factors that appear to lead to regime breakdown.   
  
78 
 
The findings of the thesis revealed that first of all, the main factors leading to the 
regime breakdown in both Poland and Egypt were similar in the sense that they 
accumulated over the years, and that they were primarily socio-economic triggers. Whether 
it was poor labor conditions, rise in food and commodity prices or lack of sufficient job 
opportunities for a growing labor force, the regime breakdowns in Egypt and Poland 
occurred when the various factions of the two country’s society joined their efforts, 
organized their movements and exerted constant, targeted pressures on the regimes, as a 
result of a deepening economic and social crisis that has led a deterioration in the quality of 
life of citizens, consequently leading to political instability and the breakdown of both 
regimes. 
In the case of Egypt, the role of CSOs and youth groups was not sudden or limited 
to the 2011 events. In fact, decades before these groups exerted efforts on multiple levels to 
increase the civic awareness and education of the activists and youth groups, in addition to 
continuous lobbying of the state towards enacting human rights laws and regulations. The 
continuous years of suppression and one-man-rule led to an accumulation of public dissent 
and frustration, which helped to fuel and mobilize the protests in significantly large 
numbers. Moreover, the so-called internet revolution, the Egyptian youth bulge, the 
economic failures of Mubarak’s regime, and the autocratic 30-year rule of Mubarak, are the 
main factors that led to an 18-day open protest in Tahrir Square. January 25, 1952 marked a 
heroic incident in Egypt. It is no coincidence that the mass movements in Egypt were 
started on January 25th, which is a celebrated national holiday. Salamey & Pearson (2011) 
argue that revolutionary outbreaks cannot erupt suddenly without any prior reasons; rather 
they are the accumulation of past experiences and grievances by the people over a lapse of 
time. For future research, the following question remains: What are the success factors that 
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affect the role of CSOs and youth groups in achieving regime breakdown? How do they 
vary across cultures and geopolitical contexts? Answering such questions is expected to 
provide interesting answers and revelations. 
In the larger framework of comparative studies of regime breakdown, it is worth 
noting what Geddes (1999) said: “Authoritarian regimes…break down in systematically 
different ways, and they also affect post-transition outcomes”. Accordingly, the popular 
protests that led to regime breakdowns in Egypt and Poland highlight the success of civil 
society movements in being catalysts for regime change and how an authoritarian regime 
can result in a destructive backlash from its own society leading to its breakdown. Yet it 
can also be argued that post-transitional societies are often characterized by a higher, or at 
least high, level of unrest than the circumstances of the previous regime. However, a large 
body of research emphasizes interactions of repression-mobilization which take place 
during periods of initial unrest among the various civic actors.  
Yet, the transitional environment which was produced in the wake of regime change 
can result in political conditions that are equally unstable for the citizenry, shaping the 
conflict dynamic of the future. The course of political violence is not determined only by 
the response of the leader to the direct bottom-up challenge which he faces, but rather a 
complex combination of socio-political settings that existed in pre- and post-regime 
breakdown that have the most influence on the transition of a regime to a new government, 
democracy or system. This necessitates further research in the case of Egypt, specifically 
on how the current new system will manage the tensions, conflicts and potential periods of 
unrest that are destined to shape the country’s post-Mubarak future. 
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